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Cybersecurity management is often seen as complex and non-linear because of the 
constantly evolving factors such as technology, agents, and the type and nature of 
cyber threats that make it difficult to design sustainable interventions. Importantly, 
institutions, society and markets are in a continuous process of evolution. It is this 
evolution that makes cybersecurity governance complex to manage. Management is 
currently faced with an insufficient understanding of sustainable interventions that 
would address the evolution of cybersecurity governance in meaningful ways. This 
study addresses this conundrum by drawing on theories such as social systems theory 
and post-structuralism from management and information systems disciplines to 
develop a solid framework for effective cybersecurity governance. The quantitative 
research that was carried out drew important constructs that would assist in 
understanding cybersecurity governance. These constructs were tested empirically to 
determine which of them would most likely address a sustainable cybersecurity 
governance approach. The quantitative research approach was useful since it was 
effective in answering the quantifiable ‘what’ and ‘how’ types of questions. A survey, 
distributed online via a link, was chosen as the preferred research method and a 
sample of 160 respondents agreed to participate in the study. The hypotheses drawn 
from constructs were tested, data analysed and results obtained. The findings of this 
research indicate that interestingly, changes in cybersecurity governance are largely 
as a result of changes in institutional goals, changes in threats, and the evolution of 
explanation. Indeed, as evolutional changes occur, if management can intervene at 
the institutional goal, security threat and explanatory policy levels, cybersecurity 
governance could become much more sustainable. What was most unexpected from 
the study findings was that the evolution of technology and the evolution of user 
interaction did not significantly influence the evolution of cybersecurity governance. 
These findings also mirror the rising importance of evolutionary governance in 
cybersecurity, as discussed in the literature review section. This also means that 
management must adjust existing cybersecurity strategy and policy in such a way that 
they shift their focus slightly away from those two aspects and instead ensure more 
expertise and expenditure is directed on those aspects that have a direct impact on 
the evolution of cybersecurity governance., as predicted by both the evolutionary 
governance theory and Giddens’s structuration theory. Having such a plan in place 
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helps organisations to reduce the impact of the attack should it occur. Besides the fact 
that business continuity management and improved information security are ensured, 
stakeholder confidence is also improved. 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction and Background 
This chapter introduces the thematic area concerning cybersecurity and how 
governance plays an important role in managing and mitigating business risks 
emanating from cybersecurity threats. The chapter provides a background on why it 
is important to study cybersecurity governance. Importantly, the chapter introduces 
the framework to study cybersecurity governance, namely the post-structuralism 
approach and uses this approach to define the research objective and questions. The 
chapter concludes with a research outline regarding how the research work was 






As businesses embrace digital transformation, there is increasing reliance on 
automation and investments in cloud technology, big data, DevOps processes and a 
booming IoT network, meaning added pressure on information security. Cloud 
computing is a model that enables the sharing of resources ubiquitously and 
conveniently as and when needed (Mell and Grance, 2011). Big data, on the other 
hand, refers to large data sets that have a more complex and varied structure, making 
it difficult to store, analyse and visualise for further processing (Sagiroglu and Sinanc, 
2013). A large number of physical objects embedded with sensors and software can 
connect to form a network described as IoT (Stergiou et al., 2018). Automation in 
DevOps software development has also evolved to help developers with better 
connectivity of what was previously isolated silos of operations (Ebert et al., 2016).  
Cyber threats, from insiders, nation-states, competitors and cybercriminals are a 
given, the cost to business is increasing and businesses continue to suffer from the 
impact of these attacks. Often, the need to respond to such changes has led to 
information security being deprioritised even if the expanded attack surface is 
increasing the risk of information security incidents (CyberArk, 2019). It would 
therefore be logical that organisations understand that the impact and demands of 
technological transformation are creating the need for further changes to risk-aware 
cybersecurity investments.  
The term evolution refers to changes in characteristics of a specimen over time. 
Cybersecurity, a subset of information security, is the practice of defending IT 
resources and data from either external or internal attacks (Kaspersky, 2020). The ISO 
standard, of the International Organisation for Standardization, defines IT governance 
as "the system by which an organisation directs and controls security governance, 
specifies the accountability framework and provides oversight to ensure that risks are 
adequately mitigated, while management ensures that controls are implemented to 
mitigate risks," (ISO/IEC27001, 2013). Thus, governance of cybersecurity involves 
“procedures that influence other actions” (Sylvan, 2014).  
For a long time now, cybersecurity governance has been viewed as the domain of the 
IT staff and in the past, the biggest threat was that a computer virus would 
inconvenience a small number of computer users (Andre, 2017). In healthcare, for 
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example, medical records were paper-based and healthcare organisations’ systems 
had limited exposure to the internet. Also, they were minimal external threats and the 
extent of damage that could be done was much less. Furthermore, previously, the 
perpetrators of hacking were predominantly associated with techno-vandals, thrill-
seekers or government-sponsored spy agents. As a result, many organisations were 
relatively immune to cyber-attacks from these old-school hackers who saw little value 
in what they did (Andre, 2017). That was then. Today, there are many other motives 
of cyber-attacks, with hackers representing the clearest and most present danger, 
particularly in the financial services, manufacturing and healthcare sectors due to the 
vast quantity of personal information and potential monetary gain that exist in those 
fields (CyberArk, 2019).  
With cyber-attacks continuing unabated (Fortinet, 2017), it is critical for organisations 
to re-strategize and prioritise their investment in cybersecurity, revise present security 
controls and continuously train their skilled personnel to always be prepared to combat 
attackers’ ability to compromise privileged credentials that allow them not only to gain 
control of targeted assets but also discover additional resources to infiltrate or 
compromise (CyberArk, 2019). Also, most organisations are still not prepared for this 
dynamic and fast-moving nature of cyber threats by high-profile hackers who are 
mostly agile, motivated, and clever.  
The evolutionary nature of cybersecurity governance is driven by the ever-increasing, 
advanced and challenging threat landscape. Recent reports suggest that the cost to 
business is increasing along with the number of successful attacks. CyberArk (2019) 
states that the average number of security breaches in 2018 rose from 130 to 145, 
and in that same period, the average cost of cybercrime increased from US$1.4 million 
to US$13.0—further evidence that cybersecurity governance remains a significant 
challenge across many institutions. Implementing and enforcing the existing 
cybersecurity governance measures has not been effective for many organisations 






The concept of cybersecurity has been in use since the new millennium, although each 
country may have interpreted the concept independently based on definitions from 
their respective governments (Kyoung-Sik et al., 2015). Cybersecurity is defined as 
“the collection of tools, security concepts, guidelines, best practices, technologies, risk 
management approaches, security safeguards, training and actions that can be used 
to protect organisations and their cyber environments as well as the users’ assets,” 
(Eugen and Petruţ, 2018). 
Today, proper and adequate cybersecurity mechanisms are no longer an option but a 
necessity for most organisations and as such, the various key points and different 
scopes that relate to cybersecurity must be put into perspective. 
Firstly, mediation between governmental departments has increasingly become 
important during both administration and policymaking processes, as reported by 
Kyoung-Sik et al. (2015). Multiple organisations are expected to carry out their policies 
rather than each organisation having its own policies and practices. Secondly, there 
is a strong emphasis on private-public enterprise partnerships. Cyberspace is vastly 
operated and controlled by the private sector and it is therefore essential that private 
and public sectors cooperate to properly respond to any threats aimed at the 
cyberspace. The third key point is that people have come to realise that international 
cooperation is key to the governance of cybersecurity. Issues related to cybersecurity 
and thus its governance cannot be settled by individual states or organisations unitarily 
but need international cooperation. This might, however, prove to be a challenge since 
international cooperation security policies generally involve confidential information in 
the national defence. The fourth point emphasises respect of fundamental values of 
the internet such as freedom of expression, privacy and the free circulation of 
information in various countries as part of their cybersecurity strategies. 
 
1.3. IT Governance: Strategy and Goals 
Organisations worldwide must be able to clearly define their risk management 
policies, strategy and goals if they are to establish an effective cybersecurity 
governance programme. This entails assessing current risk management 
approaches by senior management before defining the strategy and goals. The 
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strategy is therefore a high-level document that sets a roadmap for the organisation 
in maintaining and improving its risk management approach (Swinton, 2019). Some 
elements that are key when developing an effective cybersecurity strategy include 
understanding how cybersecurity risks relate to the business operations, determining 
resource needs, determining the risk appetite, identifying cybersecurity needs, 
developing objectives and establishing continuous monitoring 
Organisations have daily tasks that need to be completed through certain processes 
and by specific personnel. However, management of such tasks, if at all, is not always 
done as effectively as it could be done. As a result, without approved, standardised 
processes that are repeatable, organisations cannot ensure quality, efficiency or 
consistency. Establishment of repeatable processes is key to an organisation’s 
cybersecurity governance programme (Swinton, 2019). 
Processes must be put in place to enforce the requirement, otherwise, the 
cybersecurity governance programme will fail to occur, and requirements will be 
ignored and become inconsistent. An effective cybersecurity governance programme 
must be measurable and enforceable and ensure accountability for compliance across 
all personnel levels (Swinton, 2019). 
Organisations need to embrace the fact that cybersecurity governance is an enterprise 
concern and ensure that the focus and direction of their cybersecurity programme 
come from top management if the process is to achieve its goals. Senior leadership 
must remain engaged for the lifecycle of the cybersecurity programme to ensure that 
the entire organisation understands their commitment to implementing high 
cybersecurity governance standards. Senior management must also ensure that 
adequate resources, including funding, are available to the organisation to meet basic 
cybersecurity governance and compliance needs that conform to the cybersecurity 
strategy and goals.  
Finally, as suggested by Kshetri and Kshetri (2016), cybersecurity governance 
enablers such as technology vendors, private sector organisations, cybersecurity 
practitioners and regulators, must be drawn together towards coordination, 




1.4. Research Gap 
As institutional evolution occurs, existing cybersecurity policies and practices need to 
change and adapt to ensure that they remain resilient to managing cybersecurity 
attacks. Management is currently faced with an insufficient understanding of 
sustainable interventions that would address the evolution of cybersecurity 
governance in meaningful ways. This study addresses this conundrum by drawing on 
theories such as social systems theory and post-structuralism from management and 
information systems disciplines to develop a solid framework for effective 
cybersecurity governance.  
 
1.5. Problem Statement 
Literature shows that many cybersecurity governance mechanisms are not sustained 
because new cybersecurity threats continually evolve (Kshetri and Kshetri, 2016). 
Despite the advancement in technology, evolving institutional goals, and roles of the 
human agency within organisations, the complexity of cyber threats remain. As a 
result, existing mitigating strategies remain unsustainable with many becoming 
ineffective over time. A call to address new mitigating strategies is therefore needed.  
 
1.6. Research Objectives 
The objectives of this research are to review existing literature on cybersecurity 
governance and mitigation strategies and draw on new insights regarding the role that 
evolution has played in addressing cybersecurity governance. The research applies 
scientific procedures and empirically tests derived hypotheses to increase our 
understanding of how sustainable cybersecurity threat governance can be improved. 
This will be accomplished through testing of hypotheses derived from a proposed post-
structural/structuration (PSS) evolutionary governance theory (EGT) framework.  
 
1.7. Research Questions 
In light of the aforementioned research gap and problem, the following questions have 
been formulated for this research: 
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 What have been the main drivers of the evolution of cybersecurity threats 
and how effective are the existing cybersecurity governance mechanisms in 
organisations helping in managing these threats?  
 How are the changes in institutional goals affecting the formulation of 
effective cybersecurity governance strategies? 
 What role has technology in the context of a post-structuralism age played 
in the governance of cybersecurity? 
 What are the current theories in cybersecurity governance and how could 
these be used to contribute towards effective sustainable cybersecurity 
governance? 
 What has been the current role of the human agency concerning addressing 
evolutionary governance of cybersecurity?  
 
1.8 Research Design 
This research is quantitative and used an online survey targeting IT experts, which 
was distributed electronically to explore the existing understanding of the evolution of 
cybersecurity threats. The research used theories that help in explaining how 
technology has evolved, and how changes in institutions has also affected 
cybersecurity governance.  
 
1.9 Scope of the Research 
This research is targeted at IT professionals and experts employed in small-to-medium 
and large companies in Johannesburg, who know about cybersecurity and also 
participate in matters related to cybersecurity policies and practices in their respective 
organisations. 
 
1.10 Organisation of the Research Dissertation 




Figure 1: Study Layout 
Chapter 1 – Introduction and Background 
The first chapter introduces the background of the research and describes the problem 
statement, research objectives, and need for the research, which provides the 
background of the motivation of the research. A brief explanation of the research 
methodology and design is also provided.  
 
Chapter 2 – Literature Review  
The second chapter is the literature review. It is entirely dedicated to giving the reader 
an overview of the current literature available and research done by various other 
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academic writers in the field of cybersecurity governance. This chapter also identifies 
the knowledge gap that currently exists.  
 
Chapter 3 – Theoretical Lens  
This chapter identifies the different theories that the researcher uses as a basis for this 
research gap. Various key theories that currently exist relating to evolution are 
explored as well as how they fit together and are used to develop a framework for the 
researcher. 
 
Chapter 4 – Research Methodology  
This chapter explores the methodology aspects of the research. Various research 
methodologies are explained. The chapter also explores all possible research design 
techniques and identifies a suitable one for this research. Further explanation is also 
given about the target population and sampling techniques as well as their associated 
limitations.  
Possible data-gathering techniques are also explored in this chapter. Secondary data 
from the literature and the primary data gathered will be used to test the research 
hypothesis.  
 
Chapter 5 – Data Analysis  
This is the fifth chapter that aims to analyse data gathered during the literature review 
in Chapter 2, with the data gathered from the research findings in Chapter 4. This 
provides insight on how evolution of cybersecurity elements affects its governance 
 
Chapter 6 – Discussion and Conclusion  
This is the final chapter that concludes the research study and discusses the research 
questions and goals that were formulated, determining the outcome of each question. 
The conclusion also highlights limitations encountered during this study together with 
possible areas for future research.  
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1.11 Chapter 1 – Summary 
This chapter provided the reader with a basic idea behind the research topic and 
concepts. There is no silver bullet for cybersecurity governance. It must start with the 
senior executive and spread down the hierarchy to ordinary employees. Cybersecurity 
governance must be measurable and enforceable for it to be effective. An ineffective 
cybersecurity governance programme will lead to increased security breaches, 
compromises, and attacks. Senior management must understand the evolutionary 
nature of cybersecurity governance as a result of advanced cyber-attacks and ensure 
they play a role of oversight. This chapter further provided information on the 
motivation behind the research, the research objectives as well as a brief overview of 




CHAPTER 2: Literature Review  
This chapter reviews the various scholarly articles, books and journals relevant to the 
governance of cybersecurity and the significant literature that has been published 
relating to evolutionary cybersecurity governance. The chapter reveals the 
seriousness of cybersecurity in light of recent breaches and how cybersecurity threats 
have evolved. Significantly, the chapter explains the importance of cybersecurity 
governance in business by outlining factors such as institutional goals, the role of 
cybersecurity practitioners and also the broadening of the cybersecurity threat 
landscape as a result of the evolution of technology. The chapter concludes by 







Cyber data breaches and intrusion have become national news headlines with 
massive data breaches plaguing international corporate giants such as Yahoo, 
(Trautman and Ormerod, 2016), Facebook, (Silverstein, 2019) and Target (Shu et al., 
2017). The escalating cybersecurity landscape is no longer a debate but rather how 
organisations are responding to it. Businesses remain the prime targets for hackers 
because of their large area of attack, with cybercrime, terrorism and espionage at the 
beginning of their list of concerns. At the organisational level, cybersecurity has been 
considered as a back-office function, involving vulnerability patching and device 
configuration, which were considered IT problems for the IT team to worry about 
(Hamilton et al., 2015). However, because of a series of attacks in recent years, 
cybersecurity is a highest-order business risk that requires new organisation-wide 
strategies (Hamilton et al., 2015). 
 
2.2 The Seriousness of Cybersecurity Attacks 
An investigation on Target revealed that the breach leaked as many as 110 million 
customers, sales dropped by 4% whilst its profit plunged nearly 50% the following 
quarter, the share price fell by 46% and the CEO lost his job. 
A study by VMware (VMware, 2016) revealed that over 60% of executives believe that 
there will be an increase in severe and successful attacks on their firms within three 
years.  
Yahoo Inc. suffered two significant data breaches—one in 2013 exposing over 
1 billion, and the other in 2014 exposing over 500 million accounts (Trautman and 
Ormerod, 2016). Table 1 below lists some recent cybersecurity breaches and the 
associated losses. 
  
Organisation Date of Breach Number of Records Stolen 
Yahoo August 2013 3 billion 
Yahoo December 2014 500 million 
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Equifax July 2017 145.5 million 
eBay May 2014 145 million 
Target December 2013 110 million 
JP Morgan & Chase July 2014 83 million (76 million households 
and 7 million small businesses) 
Uber November 2017 57 million 
Timehop July 2018 21 million 
Facebook March 2018 50 million 
Twitter May 2018 330 million 
Table 1: Recent Cybersecurity Breaches (Source: (Cheng et al., 2017) 
The cost of experiencing a data breach is on the rise globally, with a single successful 
attack bound to cost a company a significant portion of its income (Kaspersky, 2018). 
Small companies, in particular, don’t only have to pay for emergency infrastructure 
and software improvements but also suffer from reputational losses and because of 
their smaller size, they often spend even less on training. Huge amounts of money are 
therefore consumed by these belated security awareness pieces of training coupled 
with time pressure and the desire to prevent a possible re-occurrence. 
According to further reports, annual costs related to cybercrime across the world 
reached $500 billion in 2015, a quadruple amount since 2013, and the trend is 
expected to continue again by 2020 (Burke and Franker, 2016). In South Africa alone, 
estimates put the financial loss due to cyber incidents at ZAR 50 billion in 2014 (Van 
Niekerk, 2017). These are alarming statistics that affect the organisations’ information 
security as the losses are not only monetary but also clients’ records are either lost or 
accessed illegally. This has created a cybersecurity challenge for boards of directors 
and senior executives who find themselves without a choice but to be proactive and 
understand the nature of cybersecurity risks and ensure that oversight is prioritised 
(Katz and McIntosh, 2017). 
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South Africa is particularly attractive to cybercriminals with large enterprises, and small 
and medium (SMEs), particularly vulnerable. A recent report by SABRIC (2019) 
confirmed that the banking industry in South Africa was hit by a wave of ransom-driven 
distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS) that targeted various customer-facing 
services across multiple banks. This caused customers of major banks like Standard 
Bank to experience problems with online and mobile banking services. This was not 
long after Business Day reported a breach to the City of Johannesburg’s network that 
shut down its website and all e-services, some hours after receiving a ransom note 
demand of 4.0 bitcoins—a similar technique to that used to attack the banks—from a 
group called Shadow Kill Hacker (BusinessDay, 2019). The global Cyber Exposure 
Index ranks South Africa sixth on the list of most-targeted countries for cyber-attacks 
according to a report by First Distribution Epsidon Technology Holdings Distribution 
(2019).  
Cybersecurity breaches can involve a breach of Personal Health Information (PHI) and 
Personally Identifiable Information (PII), in which case the organisation may be subject 
to a fine or penalty. Moreover, expenses and time will certainly be required for legal 
counsel, public relations, breach disclosure activities and credit-monitoring services 
for those people whose information was compromised. 
The deep infiltration of new technologies into business processes across enterprises, 
from small to large corporations, has contributed to the current rise in cyber-attacks 
and incidences. The internet and smart devices have rapidly become prevalent and 
the use of “cyberspace” is now part of daily lives for many individuals (Kshetri and 
Kshetri, 2016). The utilization of cyberspace is therefore expanding with more focus 
on big data, cloud computing and the Internet of Things (IoT). In the meantime, 
organised attacks targeting cyberspace have brought about a lot of confusion as they 
have become enhanced and complicated. 
Furthermore, discussions on cybersecurity and the appropriate institutions to contain  
Cyberspace-related risks and threats have been filling meeting tables and conference 
rooms of cyber intellectuals, policymakers and academics in recent years, in reaction 
to the rising numbers of cybersecurity incidents and perceived increased 
vulnerabilities (Schmidt, 2014). As shown in Figure 2, cybersecurity governance must 
take a holist approach from board level to create cyber-resilient organisations. The 
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effects of a successful cyber-attack do not just impact a section of it but the entire 
organisation and its board. 
 
Figure 2: Probability and Impact of Cyber Risks 
In the midst of all this, many national governments and public and private institutions 
are facing a cybersecurity crisis as they seek to deter cyber criminals, control content, 
secure their critical infrastructure and simultaneously foster economic growth 
(Shackelford and Craig, 2014). The study further noted that this has also been largely 
compounded by the global “digital divide” of technological resources between the 
“have” and “have-not” organisations across developing countries to address 
cybersecurity.  
How cybersecurity must be governed has been a contentious issue since the late 
1990s, according to Shackelford and Craig (2014), and an increase in sophistication 
of cyber-attacks in recent years, coupled with the complex nature of institutional 
processes and the socio-economic shift, has exacerbated and amplified stakes for a 
corresponding approach to cybersecurity governance. 
The nature of the governance of cybersecurity addresses complex and non-linear 
approaches that are vastly different from past practices and policies (Van Assche et 
al., 2014). Evolutionary governance calls for different theoretical approaches that 
recognise that governance and its elements of security threats, security practitioners 
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and institutions are constantly changing in interplay with each other. It emphasises the 
co-evolution between discourses, actors and institutions (Ostrom, 2014). 
As cyber threats continue to grow in sophistication and numbers, so does the need for 
cybersecurity professionals, including the board and senior executives, to become 
more involved and proactive in their defence against these attacks. Most boards are, 
however, still taking a “head in the sand approach” with the belief that it cannot happen 
to them (North et al., 2016). As technology evolves, cyber-attacks are also becoming 
more sophisticated and it is inevitable that boards get involved in matters related to 
cybersecurity and understand that it is an enterprise-wide problem and not just for the 
IT department. Furthermore, information and cybersecurity have been identified as 
being of strategic importance such that not many organisations have any IT risk 
management plan currently to protect their data and sensitive information (North et al., 
2016, Yegelwel, 2015). The inability to reduce cyber-attacks has not been attributed 
to failure to block them but rather to the lack of proper controls, time to detect and 
other related safeguards needed (German, 2016). 
The rise of cybersecurity attacks is a concern throughout the world and has been partly 
attributed to a lack of proper information technology governance, starting with the 
board of directors, because most of them do not understand cybersecurity (North et 
al., 2016). The dilemma remains for SMEs that may not have sufficient structure and 
budget to invest in cybersecurity (ZyXEL, 2015). For larger companies, the boards 
have a fiduciary duty to treat cybersecurity as a corporate concern and protect the 
company’s sensitive data to minimise data breaches (Yegelwel, 2015).  
Every other week, another country or organisation sets up new cybersecurity 
strategies, proposes new cybersecurity-related legislation or updates its cybersecurity 
strategies, with countless cybersecurity ideas and designs exchanged across multiple 
forums (Schmidt, 2014). However, there is still little of this organisational and 
institutional innovation being facilitated by IT-based technologies that appears to 
become global cybersecurity governance policies. Official cybersecurity governance 
is designed along with traditional partnerships between the public-private sectors and 
national security provisioning through traditional security institutions. Discussions 
among the private and public organisations on new forms of distributed collaboration 
are still scarce in the domain of cybersecurity governance. Furthermore, research on 
the various participants and their collaborative endeavours that have kept the 
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cyberspace safe after numerous cyber-attacks and incidents have been minimal 
(Schmidt, 2014). 
The notion from this proposed research is based on the fact that no company is safe 
from security breaches and cybersecurity implementations would not succeed if the 
board is not involved (Reber, 2016). The fight again cyber-attacks is never-ending, 
which means that organisations must constantly reassess their environments for any 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Consequently, the primary objective of this study is to 
review the board’s understanding of cybersecurity from a corporate enterprise 
perspective and how the board needs to get more proactive in implementing 
cybersecurity measures to minimise risks to information security (Yegelwel, 2015). It 
is therefore critical that companies incorporate information and cybersecurity 
awareness into their corporate governance structures to ensure effective 
implementation of security mechanisms commencing from the boardroom, instead of 
relegating the topic to the IT department (ISACA, 2014). Chief information security 
officers (CISO) are facing a burn-out in the face of escalating cyber-threats, insufficient 
budgets as well as the inability of the boards to engage them (Muncaster, 2019a). The 
findings by Trend Micro in 2018 revealed that security in IoT remains an afterthought 
for many IT and security decision-makers and only 38% were able to consult CISOs 
when they deploy such solutions and 65% of CISOs also claimed a lack of 
engagement with the board as a challenge (Edwards, 2018). 
The main responsibility of the board is to ensure that the company’s future is secure. 
It is therefore through the abilities of the board and management that companies 
survive and can cope with unpredictable future events and anticipated impacts on the 
organisation and industry as a whole (ISACA, 2014). 
 
2.3 Cybersecurity Governance Concept 
Cybersecurity governance refers to the component of enterprise governance that 
addresses the organisation’s dependence on cyberspace, which is, how enterprises 
detect, prevent, and respond to cyber incidents from a strategic perspective, . 
Cybersecurity governance is, therefore, both preventive and corrective and covers 
precautions taken against cyber-warfare, cybercrime, and other relevant forms of 
attacks emanating from cyberspace. Furthermore, cybersecurity governance 
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determines the processes and procedures needed to deal with incidents that may be 
caused by an information security breach, (Pardini et al., 2017). This study discusses 
the evolutionary governance theory and the structuration theory as the two key 
theories that explain how the evolution of particular constructs affects the evolution of 
cybersecurity governance. 
2.4 Evolution of Cybersecurity Threats 
While cybersecurity has become far more sophisticated over the past decade, so has 
the nature of cyber-attacks, and the amount of devices that can access valuable 
company information is on a continued rise. The evolution of the Internet of Things 
(IoT) also means more exposure to devices that are vulnerable to hacking through 
bots. 
A 2014 Global Risks report published by the World Economic Forum ranks the 
likelihood of cyber-attacks occurring at fifth and remains in the top-right quadrant of 
business risks (Schwab, 2014). Enterprise threats to data leaks may take various 
forms and may be classified as shown in Figure 3 below. 
 
Figure 3: Classification of Enterprise Data Leak Threats (Source: (Cheng et al., 
2017) 
A 2019 research independently conducted by Opinion Matters and commissioned by 
Egress Software Technologies released a report that offered insight on how chief 
information officers (CIOs) and employees differed on their understanding of data 
ethics, ownership and the root causes of insider threat (Egress, 2019). The report 
showed the gap that exists between IT leaders and employees on how they view 
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sensitive data and that combined with the rapid growth in unstructured data, has the 
potential to negatively impact cybersecurity programmes of an organisation. The 
report highlights that 79% of IT leaders believe that in the last 12 months, employees 
have accidentally put company data at risk with 61% of those believing that they have 
done so maliciously. Furthermore, IT leaders give employees the benefit of the doubt 
and believe 60% of those are primarily caused unintentionally by employees rushing 
and making mistakes. Only 30% of the respondents believe that internal breaches 
result from deliberate leaking of data by employees to harm the organisation, whilst 
28% believe employees steal data for financial gain, as illustrated in Figure 2.2 below 
(Egress, 2019). 
 
Figure 4: Causes of Insider Threat Breaches (Source: (Egress, 2019) 
One particular concern from the Egress (2019) report was that 60% of employees did 
not believe that the organisation has exclusive ownership of the data. This proportion 
of employees still believes that the data they collect, manage and distribute is personal 
and belongs to them or their department and as such, they can choose how and with 
whom they share it. Furthermore, the ambiguity of emails, the growing use of FTP 
sites, and the use of file-sharing services such as Dropbox and Slack give users more 
tools to share information than ever before and combined with automated features 
such as the auto-insert in Outlook, opportunities for accidental data breaches will grow 
exponentially (Egress, 2019). Therefore, implementing an evolutionary cybersecurity 
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governance strategy, which is easy to use and work with and based on a post-
structural approach, would ensure that IT leaders move from minimising data breaches 
to stopping them from happening in the first place. 
Consumers have, over the years, shown more concern about the potential misuse or 
abuse of their data, particularly that which is collected through social media usages 
from their mobile devices. When data is first collected, organisations may also not be 
aware of possible secondary uses of such data by third parties but discover this at a 
later stage. This is a concern to consumers who are now developing a tendency 
towards exercising their power and put pressure on organisations to take measures to 
enhance privacy and security of users’ data. For example, Dropbox released updates 
in response to user pressure (Kshetri and Kshetri, 2016). Organisations and users are 
demanding an explicit guarantee from their vendors for the security of their data and 
liability clauses in their contracts and this is influencing a change in cybersecurity 
governance.  
The Economist Intelligence Unit (VMware, 2016) reported that cyber-criminals 
prioritise customer information assets as much as the organisations do. This active 
and liquid criminal market for customers incentivises theft of credit cards, social 
security numbers and health information, as this can be held for ransom or sold as a 
commodity. 
Banks remain a highly attractive target by owning customers’ personally identifiable 
information and detailed records of their past spending, which is highly sensitive 
information. Cyber-attacks targeting banks include fraud related to payments cards, 
disruption of websites and network infiltrations to steal money (Kshetri and Kshetri, 
2016). Increasingly, phishing emails targeted at individuals with privileged access to 
sensitive data, corporate banking accounts and other critical enterprise assets have 
also emerged (Verizon, 2017). These are new kinds of monetised attacks that target 
vulnerabilities existing within the email authentication mechanisms. 
Similarly, healthcare organisations keep the medical and financial personal 
information that is highly attractive to cybercriminals since it takes longer before 
victims realise that their information has been stolen. Cybercriminals can then use this 
medical information to impersonate patients to obtain a prescription for specific 
regulated diseases (Kshetri and Kshetri, 2016). 
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Online cyber-attackers are continuously developing new and innovative ways of 
exploiting vulnerabilities in their attempt to break into enterprise networks and carry 
out malicious activities (Abraham, 2020). Figure 5 below illustrates the various forms 
of malware that are known to be major contributors to the rise in cyber-attacks.  
 
Figure 5: Forms of Malware (Source: (Abraham, 2020) 
Malware activities are usually sophisticated, targeting specific applications or systems 
that evade anti-malware and traditional defence mechanisms (Vijayan, 2018). In a 
recent report, Forbes Technology Council (2019) suggests that a new malware threat 
has been developed that runs and stays in computer memory—it is harder to detect 
and thus more difficult to guard against because it does not leave any footprint. 
Organisations are thus expected to change and, for example, consider using endpoint 
detection and response tools as well as malware detection products that use both 
signature-based approaches for detection of known malware, sandboxing and 
behaviour-based approaches to detect new and unknown malware (Vijayan, 2018). 
Also, the growth in enterprise demand for cybersecurity has been the driving force for 
threat intelligence platforms and cyber threat intelligence (CTI) services.  
Hardware exploits have been relatively rare because manufacturers have made their 
development and implementation very difficult. This has since changed, however, with 
the discovery of the first-ever firmware-level rootkit known as LoJax that is designed 
to work on a computer’s Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI). Reports 
suggested that this rootkit is capable of installing malware that survived both OS 
reinstallation and hard disk replacement (Vijayan, 2019).  
Google Project Zero further disclosed yet another significant hardware vulnerability, 
the Meltdown and Spectre, in late 2017 and early 2018. These vulnerabilities were 
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said to be present on most of the modern CPUs, Intel and AMD included, stemming 
from “speculative execution”, a performance-enhancing technique that enables side-
channel attacks for stealing cryptographic secrets and data (Vijayan, 2019). Such 
vulnerabilities are tempting enough for cyber-attackers to explore possible attack 
opportunities. 
For enterprises, if such hardware attacks were successful, it would be a nightmare 
because of their difficulty to not only detect but to also mitigate and recover from, and 
users may be faced with persistent hardware reset and reboot issues. Hardware threat 
mitigation is not going to be easy either because all efforts of device hardening at all 
levels must start at the manufacturer. Organisations perceive compromised hardware 
as being pretty close to the endgame. 
Organisations are also expected to continuously roll out IoT devices in their pursuit of 
digital transformation and this is expected to substantially attract more attention from 
cyber-attackers in the upcoming years. A malware known as Mirai surfaced in 2016, 
where IoT devices were used by cyber-attackers to build botnets and then launch 
massive DDoS attacks (Herberger et al., 2017), and cybersecurity experts estimate 
that more than a million of IoT devices are taking part in these coordinated attacks.  
VPNFilter, an IoT malware tool, later emerged in that same year, infecting over 
500,000 small home office routers, stealing user details such as usernames, 
passwords and other data from the compromised devices and then disabling these 
devices reported (Vijayan, 2019). It was later revealed that close to 25 000 CCTV 
cameras and digital video recorders were compromised and then used to launch 
DDoS attack that flooded its target. A few days later, the same botnet attacked the 
DNS provider Dyn in what publicly later became known as a “water torture” attack, 
rendering many services unreachable and causing major connectivity issues 
(Mansfield-Devine, 2018, Chacos and Simon, 2018) 
This was followed by another recent data-stealing tool known as Torii, which uses up 
to six techniques on an infected device to remain persistent. This has triggered 
cybersecurity expects to warn organisations of the consequences of these attacks 
extending beyond malware and botnets deployment as attackers try to use these 
compromised IoT networks to gain entry into corporate networks as more IoT devices 
are deployed. Vijayan (2019) reported that the reason cyber-attackers are becoming 
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interested in IoT is that many of these devices contain relatively known and easily 
exploitable vulnerabilities that include lack of support for both authentication and 
security updates. Herberger et al. (2017) also cited several other reasons why IoT 
devices are attractive targets for hackers, including: (1) that the devices fall short of 
implementing endpoint protection; (2) the devices are always in operation throughout 
the day and as such, are in use at any moment; and (3) IoT devices are not under any 
security regulations or standards like servers or PCs. Regulations such as changing 
of default passwords and implementation of access-control restrictions ensure that 
configurations and restrictions are secure. 
Cybersecurity experts are also expected to change their approach to governance as 
business email compromises become more sophisticated. Although the concept of 
business email scams is not new, it has evolved over the past few years and has 
become more rampant and its threats have significantly grown to target every 
organisation, particularly real estate agents and law firms, as reported by the FBI 
(2019). Criminals in this form of attack trick the targeted individuals into transferring 
funds from their company accounts into accounts that they compromised by assuming 
the identity of one of the C-Suite executives and fraudulently use that identity to send 
false instructions. The constantly changing formats of these compromised business 
emails have also heightened as attackers respond to organisational awareness 
around these scams.  
A 2016-2017 report by Radware cited malware and bots as the number one type of 
cyber-attack experienced in that year, as shown in Figure 6 below. 
 
 




As the nature of threats changes over the years, hackers are becoming more 
innovative to stay ahead of their victims. New cyber-attack approaches are being 
implemented regularly and new malware created that attempts to by-pass traditional 
security mechanisms. This has a direct influence on cybersecurity governance. 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): A change in cybersecurity threats leads to a change in evolution of 
cybersecurity governance. 
 
2.5 Cybersecurity Practitioners 
The shortage of the cybersecurity workforce remains a big challenge with global 
organisations suffering a crippling cybersecurity workforce ‘”gap” of 2.9 million 
employees to date, with Europe, the Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) suffering a 
shortfall of 142 000 (Muncaster, 2018). These figures are astronomical and there are 
further claims that they could rise to a global figure of 3.5 million by 2021, putting the 
majority of organisations at greater risk of attack, ((ISC)2, 2018). 
Furthermore, (Muncaster, 2019b) estimates that over 52% of IT and cybersecurity 
professionals believe that the shortage of cybersecurity skills are putting their business 
at an increased risk of attack. The (ISC)² Cybersecurity Workforce Study (2018) further 
revealed that 63% of organisations are at moderate to extreme levels of risks of cyber-
attacks, as depicted in Figure 7 below, with nearly 28% of organisations saying they 
have the right amount of staff dedicated to cybersecurity. These include technical 
skills, particularly in threat intelligence, incidence response, forensic investigation, 




Figure 7: Current Cybersecurity Staffing & Level of Risk Caused by Staff Shortage 
(Source: ((ISC)2, 2018) 
Organisations are not only finding it difficult to fill entry-level roles but also find it harder 
to keep people interested once they are there. At the top of the hierarchy, boards want 
CISOs to manage the dynamics of how security can enhance the business vision and 
strategy and improve articulation of business risks. CISOs and CIOs thus need to 
develop better board and executive communication skills when reporting cybersecurity 
programme incidents and activities (Westby, 2015). The breach on Target revealed 
the disastrous nature of the consequences to the company’s board and executive 
team when they are not prepared to manage major cybersecurity incidents. Although 
the breach was clever, it was not impossible to recover from, but Target’s executive 
team and the board failed to ensure a robust incident response and protect the 
company’s data (Shu et al., 2017). 
Lack of talent has been identified as the biggest barrier to recruiting, followed by lack 
of recruitment budget and lack of interest in the cybersecurity career ((ISC)2, 2018). 
The education of employees, particularly those with escalated privileges, needs to 
form part of cybersecurity governance—from simple tasks of security updates and 
patching, to download behaviour using personal devices and cloud solutions (Green, 
2015). A successful cybersecurity governance strategy is thus characterised by agility 
and supported by expertise from the team that can enable them to respond to the 
threat of a breach and act before it affects the business.  
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Furthermore, the 2018 (ISC)² Cybersecurity Workforce Study on cybersecurity 
revealed that professionals expect to enhance and improve their level of expertise in 
top priority areas based on future demand, as illustrated in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8: Areas to Enhance or Grow (Source: (ISC)2 (2018) 
A recent IBM-sponsored study conducted by the Ponemon Institute shows that 
organisations are investing in cybersecurity automation as a way of relieving IT teams 
that struggle to recruit enough skilled workers (Ponemon, 2019). Although for many, 
these investments are justified as a way of closing in on the cybersecurity skills gap, 
security teams are faced with the biggest obstacle of a lack of automation expertise 
needed to reap the most out of these tools. 
A 2019 report released by the SANS Institute shows that while automation is on the 
uptick, organisations are warned that it is not easy or quick to implement and that they 
might need to hire extra personnel to take it to that high level of maturity that has 
extensive automation of key processes (Filkins, 2019). The report further suggests 
that automation will not reduce the need for cybersecurity professionals but rather it is 
expected to make them more effective in creating a stronger posture and improve their 




2.6 Cybersecurity Governance in Businesses 
Cybersecurity governance in businesses needs to break out of its IT jargon and 
technical box to not only focus on competitive advantage but also become a guarantor 
and enabler of its core business (Hamilton et al., 2015). Cybersecurity goes far beyond 
the benefits of IT in that it has the power to transform the business into a success. 
Successful institutions understand that governance of cybersecurity is driven from the 
top to the bottom, with senior executives explaining how effective cybersecurity 
governance will successfully drive the business to future success. Some cybersecurity 
experts are advocating for the need to redefine cybersecurity by vastly expanding the 
organisation’s approach and providing more resources to train the next generation 
(Hamilton et al., 2015). 
As stated by Warner (2012), there are human vulnerabilities throughout the 
organisation’s systems where individuals act, deliberately or accidentally, and 
jeopardise protected information. Also, hardware vulnerabilities shared among 
computers, the consoles and communication systems, software vulnerabilities and 
system vulnerabilities, such as user identification, access control, and authentication, 
exist across the organisation (Warner, 2012). Company data, stored and accessed 
through devices, is the new currency and driver for all businesses. The sensitivity of 
the information being handled and the environment in which they operate determines 
the seriousness of these vulnerabilities and in most restrictive cases, protection 
against all invasion types would be conceivable. Investigations into the WannaCry 
cyber-attack found that many organisations were using older computer platforms 
whose security patches were issued but not yet implemented, which signified a lack 
of a proper cybersecurity governance approach to ensure that organisations are 
protected from such attacks. This was exposed in May 2017 when the WannaCry 
malware hit the National Health System (NHS) in the UK where the targeted IT 
systems were found to be still running older operating systems such as Windows XP 
(O'Dowd, 2017). 
Cybersecurity governance thus becomes an area where valuable guidance to the 
board and executive team can be provided by an independent adviser after reviewing 
available reports and then assessing the current state of information security 
programmes (Westby, 2015). Associated information flows and identified 
vulnerabilities should be directed to the senior executive with appropriate advice on 
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the threat environment to establish a proper organisational structure for effective 
cybersecurity governance. This calls for a collaborative approach between the IT 
technical staff and security leaders as they seek to gain support and visibility for 
cybersecurity initiatives, (Westby, 2015). 
“He who defends everything defends nothing” is a classic military quote that now 
applies to cyber-security, as outlined in The Economist Intelligence Unit (VMware, 
2016) report. Organisations need to concentrate their cybersecurity resources on 
assets that are most precious to them and thus hardest to recover from once lost. For 
a system functioning in an open environment, it would be unwise to incorporate 
sensitive or classified information unless there is a significant risk of accidental 
disclosure that will be accepted (Warner, 2012). Spending on cybersecurity thus needs 
to align with all collaborative workflow systems across the organisation and anticipate 
the most likely path(s) for accidental breaches and mitigate them before they happen 
(Egress, 2019).  
 
2.7 Evolution of Technology 
Technology is itself complex and changing all the time and organisations need to keep 
anticipating where the next threat will come from and shift their focus accordingly. 
Since technology originates from a functionalist and controlling way of how people 
think, it, however, does not necessarily imply that it allows for a similar way of dealing 
with reality. The philosophy of technology seeks to reverse this perception by 
proposing a “think forward” approach instead of backward when analysing the role 
technology plays in individuals’ everyday lives (Verbeek, 2010). Therefore, to 
understand and analyse what technology can do to people, it requires that technology 
itself be approached as concrete technological artefacts and not in terms of its 
conditions further claims Verbeek (2010). However, interpretations mediated by 
artefacts are not always directly perceptual but also indirectly co-shape the frames of 
reference from which these perceptions are interpreted. Technology co-shapes 
dimensions of perceptions in two ways called “micro perception”, a bodily-sensorial 
dimension, and “macro perceptual”, which consists of frames and cultural contexts of 
interpretation (Verbeek, 2010). In this case, what this means is that perception 
embodies duality in an illustrative way: micro perceptually, we see technology in its 
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simplest form, and macro perceptually, we see technology quite differently after 
analysing it in detail. Together these two dimensions of perception constitute people’s 
experience.  
Using the post-structuralism approach, a term (Lather, 1993) refers to as "activating 
by invention" in order to move from "yesterday's institutions" to some other place of 
social inquiry, people’s existence and experience also play a significant role in shaping 
the governance of cybersecurity in an organisation. On the one hand, experience may 
be viewed as consisting in the way the world is present for the people, existence, on 
the other hand, is seen as the way people are present in their world (Verbeek, 2010). 
Also, experience may be understood in terms of perceptions that can be interpreted 
whilst existence is based on people’s actions. 
Also, technology is “things in use” that can be viewed as neutral mediators of the 
relationships between humans and the world, involved in actively co-shaping the lives 
of people, their actions, experience, perceptions and existence. This includes artifacts, 
for example, such as the role of instruments in the production of scientific research. 
Without these, many scientific facts and theories would not exist. The reality studied 
has to be translated by these instruments into perceivable phenomena. As a result, 
what people do is co-shaped by the “things they use”. An intrusion detection or 
prevention mechanism, for instance, may translate internal staff intention from 
“performing their tasks out of responsibility” to “performing their tasks because of the 
restrictions that are set and the understanding that there are systems in place that 
monitor them”. The deployment of 5G technology is not only expected to increase 
communication speed and throughput in cellular networks but also to be widely used 
in critical communication, enterprise networking and IoT-based applications within 
private networks, stated Verbeek (2010). This is expected to open up a can of worms 
in the cyberspace as cyber-criminals try to exploit backdoors using this technology to 
compromise privacy or weaken the security of computer systems in the organisation.  
Verbeek (2010) further discerns that technologies can play the background 
relationship role that creates a context for people’s experience. Transformation of 
perceptions would therefore occur within these human-technology relations. 
Technology, in many cases, stimulates engagement and so it would be proper to 
investigate the translation of such engagements brought about by this technology, 
which in essence appears to have a structure of “invitation” and “inhibition”. Post-
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phenomenologically put, it is important to anticipate how products mediate the relation 
that they have with people, as stated by Verbeek (2010), and that for attachment to 
exist, products should generate a durable relationship not only with their functionality 
or meaning but with themselves as material products. 
In an open environment, which includes users working at unprotected physical 
consoles connected through unprotected communications to various systems, it would 
be unwise to incorporate classified or sensitive information as contemporary 
technology may not provide a secure system, (Rathore et al., 2018).  Historically, 
cyber-attacks such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) concentrated on the 
disruption of services and systems to crash the website but financial gain is now often 
the goal (Green, 2015). 
Traditional mechanisms that detect and protect sensitive data are not enough to 
perceive sensitive data flow. As a result, organisations are expected to grow and 
include the ability to proactively auto-detect and protect sensitive data or its leakage 
using the latest cloud services or artificial intelligence (AI) technologies (Forbes, 2019). 
Also, super encryption and AI may become the primary defensive mechanisms in 
cyber warfare for an organisation. AI is expected to use behavioural patterns to detect 
anomalies across the digital landscape whereas enhanced encryption technologies 
will be able to offer protection from bad actors with their ability to scale with the velocity 
and volume of today’s data, as is explained by the experts at the Forbes Technology 
Council (2019).  
Attacks on technological flaws have not been effective recently because, in the past 
couple of years, most technology vendors have managed to harden security features 
associated with their product, and attackers are looking to find different ways in 
through humans via phishing and vishing attacks (Vijayan, 2018).  
Many organisations still do not know what assets they need to defend and are unaware 
that their networks are expanding because of evolving trends such as Big Data, IoT, 
cloud services, AI and digital transformation services. Such organisations therefore do 
not have a choice but to evolve similarly and defend the expanded territory that they 
may not have planned on defending. There has been an unprecedented growth of 
connected devices to date that has created new opportunities for cyber-attacks while 
simultaneously creating numerous threats to various enterprises and consumers. A 
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recent report conducted by First Distribution (2019) and published by ITWeb estimates 
that more than 24 billion internet-connected devices will be installed globally by 2020, 
an average of more than four devices for every human on earth. The IoT devices thus 
constitute the largest unsecured attack surface for cyber threats (Vijayan, 2019). Also, 
these devices, each with its own set of technologies and security vulnerabilities, are 
networked and connected to cloud services, creating a further challenge in 
implementing global security standards. 
Technology helps to shape what is real, such as cybersecurity threats and the 
governance of cybersecurity. The philosophy of technological culture takes into 
account the material culture of technology. The analysis of the origins of technology is 
not so much what is needed but what technology can do and how it co-shapes the 
human-world relationship. The evolution of technology is embedded within the 
systems theory, explained later, and stresses that there is a connection between 
artifacts being built and the economic, political, social, and cultural factors surrounding 
it. The key concepts of the system theory include reverse salient when system 
elements lag in development to others, (Hughes, 2020, Luhmann, 2000).The evolution 
of technology therefore directly impacts both the evolution of security threats and 
cybersecurity governance. Two hypotheses can be drawn from the above: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): A change of technology leads to a change in the nature of 
cybersecurity threats. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): A change of technology leads to a change in evolution of 
cybersecurity governance. 
 
2.8 Evolution of institutional goals 
As humans erect institutions, they also establish norms and reciprocity to achieve low 
costs, stability, and predictability for interaction within the society (Duit and Galaz, 
2008). Since change (for example technology, the nature and types of cyber-attacks) 
occurs faster and is more uncertain, organisations, actors and practitioners need to 
employ a flexible governance approach to diversify and draw upon themselves a much 




Institutional changes are triggered by disruptive cybersecurity events, jolts or 
discontinuities that affect organisational stability. Such cybersecurity issues then force 
organisations to take certain measures such as changing their values, objectives and 
practices related to cybersecurity to strengthen and overcome these cyber-risks 
(Kshetri and Kshetri, 2016). For example, some organisations may consider carrying 
out security checks for their staff to prevent insider threat, which may be viewed as 
“undignified” by others. 
Most organisations, small and medium-size, view information and cybersecurity as a 
complex phenomenon requiring advanced skills to configure and administer, and thus 
give them the impression that they are not susceptible to these cyber breaches 
(Mansfield-Devine, 2016). ZyXEL (2015) further states that small-to-medium 
enterprises (SMEs) do not prioritise information security, thus making it difficult for 
senior managers to make investment decisions on cybersecurity. Furthermore, 
because most senior executives do not have sufficient knowledge about cybersecurity, 
they perceive investing in information security technology to be something similar to 
an insurance policy, which neither increases productivity nor reduces costs. 
The nature of all business is evolving, with many organisations such as banking and 
retail moving operations online (Pearson, 2014). Many businesses are now critically 
dependent on the internet and their IT infrastructure but are still struggling with how to 
integrate cybersecurity into their organisation-wide risk management processes, and 
as such, their business operations will be affected if their computers and IT systems 
failed (Westby, 2015). In the banking industry, for example, much of the software 
running on their IT systems was designed in the last decade and, because of the 
interconnectivity with other businesses, the customers and ultimately the users, 
updating it can be a real headache because it is difficult to know which systems will 
be affected and which functionality might be compromised or even lost (Pearson, 
2014). As a result, typically larger businesses effectively struggle to manage the pace 
of technological change. This means that defining and communicating the board’s 
information risk regime is central to the organisation’s overall cybersecurity strategy. 
Technology vendors continue to increase their negotiating capacity with users to 
influence them by offering new, attractive and innovative value propositions. This is an 
attempt to increase their potential power by engaging in proactive behaviours to 
develop more secure products. As service providers and the rest of organisations 
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respond to the rapidly evolving IT environment, they also make adaptation changes 
that maintain their competitive advantage across this new technological landscape, 
which greatly influences a new approach to cybersecurity governance (Kshetri and 
Kshetri, 2016). This leads to the below hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): A change of institutional goals leads to a change in evolution of 
cybersecurity governance. 
 
2.9 Attack Motives 
Although financial gain is by far the most common, it is not the only motivation. 
Furthermore, the increase in cyber-attacks has been exacerbated by technological 
advancement (Verizon, 2017, Green, 2015). A financially-motivated attacker is more 
likely going to be after the data that can be bought and sold, such as the case of the 
2017 outbreak of WannaCry (Mohurle and Patil, 2017, Chen and Bridges, 2017) and 
Petya/NotPetya (Richardson and North, 2017, Mansfield-Devine, 2016) that affected 
many organisations across the world, presumably with the propensity to pay a ransom. 
An attacker may also have ideological motives, in which case they might be looking to 
deny services or deface public-facing systems of an organisation.  
An annual Global Application and Network Security Report by Radware (2017) further 
suggests that competition was also one of the top motivations, whilst two new threats 
namely insider threat and cyberwar (state or government-sponsored cyber-attacks—
due to geopolitical tensions) emerged. The various motivations behind current 
cybersecurity attacks are illustrated in Figure 9 below. 
 
 
Figure 9: Attack Motives (Source: (Herberger et al., 2017) 
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Cyber-criminals are attackers that are interested in making money through fraud or 
from the sale of valuable information. The perpetrators are usually affiliated to a 
criminal group. In a recent report, a well-known British cybersecurity researcher 
credited with stopping the WannaCry attack pleaded guilty to developing malware to 
steal bank information (News24, 2019). Other attack motives include that of industrial 
competitors and foreign intelligence services, who are interested in gaining economic 
advantage for their companies or countries. Also, some hackers find interfering with 
computer systems an enjoyable challenge. The perpetrator in this instance wants to 
develop or prove individual skills (Herberger et al., 2017). 
The motive for hacktivists is to attack companies for political or ideological motives. 
The perpetrator is usually affiliated to an online activist group making political 
statements. Hacktivism has increasingly become popular as a threat to cybersecurity. 
This concept essentially refers to civil disobedience in the cyber-space and the 
motives range from promoting free speech, political issues or supporting human rights 
(Green, 2015). Insider threat involves employees who have legitimate access to critical 
information but act maliciously, either by accident or deliberate misuse, for personal 
reasons or gain. 
Cyber-attacks incidents may also be due to software or hardware misconfiguration in 
the system. A report on the analysis of aggregate cloud usage data by McAfee 
discovered that enterprises have an average of 14 misconfigured IaaS/PaaS instances 
running simultaneously, resulting in about 2 269 incidents related to misconfiguration 
each month (McAfree, 2018).  
EGT further detects that a change in governance must lead to new sets of policies and 
practices required to detect and mitigate effects that result from cyber-attacks. Lack of 
evolutionary perspective may lead an organisation to a series of intertwined 
cybersecurity issues and the lack of recognition of problems as problems related to 
cybersecurity governance as well as the non-recognition of governance problems as 
evolutionary may lead organisations to failure (Van Assche et al., 2014).  
At the organisational level, a Cybersecurity Incident Response Team (CSIRT) may 
need to be established to (1) define procedures, services and policies related to 
incidents response; (2) create capabilities for incident reporting; (3) identify, contain 
and eliminate incidents; (4) recover from incidents; (5) investigate incidents; (6) 
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prevent reoccurrence of incidents; and (6) integrate lessons learnt (Eugen and Petruţ, 
2018). Services of the CSIRT can be categorised as reactive, proactive and security 
quality management.  
 
2.10 Literature Review Gaps 
Over the years many papers and efforts have been produced highlighting different 
models and frameworks that exist that seek to address the evolution of cybersecurity 
governance within organizations.  From a strategic perspective, the first gap to 
approach in addressing cybersecurity governance would be the lack of applicable 
standards to address the deep infiltration of new technology into business processes 
driven by IoT. Literature suggests that to date there is insufficient technology that can 
timely and practically evaluate the quality and effectiveness of modern tools that can 
protect against attacks. 
Looking at cybersecurity personnel, the literature suggests there is a shortage of 
qualified professionals in the cybersecurity domain, at both senior and board level that 
are involved in implementing cybersecurity governance decisions at a corporate level. 
This leads to a failure by most organisations to view sensitive data which eventually 
puts the entire organisation at risk of potential attacks or misuse of data. 
The other gap identified is that of insufficient knowledge in cybersecurity governance 
for most employees in organisations as a result of the lack of training. This is because 
most companies either do not have a strategy in place or they have not reviewed the 
existing strategies on cybersecurity governance in line with the dynamically changing 
landscape to threat levels, attack tools, and technologies. Employees do not 
understand the different types of attacks and motives that exist and their resultant 
impacts should their organisations encounter those breaches. 
2.11 Chapter 2 – Summary 
This chapter outlined the different elements involved in cybersecurity as well as the 
various forms of attacks and motivation factors behind those attacks. It also looked at 
the players involved in the governance of cybersecurity such as the role of 
practitioners in business strategies. Also, the chapter looked at trends in information 




CHAPTER 3: Theoretical Lens 
This chapter provides a common worldview that supports certain behaviour in the core 
area of cybersecurity governance. It provides a background on the theoretical rationale 
and conceptual framework to substantiate the current study as one that is based on 
established theories. The chapter introduces the concepts of cybersecurity, systems 
theory and post-structuralism. Additionally, the chapter discusses the structuration 
governance model to develop a hypothesis based on the strong possibility that the 
predictions evolving from the frameworks will be supported. The chapter further 
outlines the theory of the evolution of agency to provide a frame of reference and 
concludes with the proposed post-structuralism/structuration cybersecurity 






This chapter explores the various theories and models to unpack the complexities 
involved in the governance of cybersecurity as a result of evolution. The chapter 
further identifies more hypotheses that must be tested during the design of the 
framework. 
 
3.2 Cybersecurity and Systems Theory 
The systems theory as a framework can assist cybersecurity professionals to 
understand the various issues related to cybersecurity and thus its governance as it 
forms the building blocks of EGT (Cordon, 2013). Also, Cordon (2013) defines a 
system as “a regularly interacting or independent group of items forming a unified 
whole”, whilst Wright and Meadows (2009) define a system as “a set of things, people, 
cells, molecules, or whatever—interconnected in such a way that they produce their 
own pattern of behaviour over time”. Other definitions are simple and general such as: 
“a totality of elements in interaction” or “the dynamic interrelatedness of components” 
(Leighninger, 1978). Furthermore, a system can be simple or complex, where it 
includes many other network systems and micro-systems or is open or closed. These 
definitions are consistent with each other in that they share these four domains: (1) 
the existence of a group of objects, forces or molecules; (2) the interactions or 
relationships between these groups; (3) the formation of a larger, whole unit from these 
groups; and (4) the purpose of the elements within the smaller group and how they 
affect the purpose or function as a whole (Cordon, 2013). The systems theory is not a 
new concept because early philosophers have also discussed the notion of thinking 
about things as a whole and not in parts. 
Evolutionary governance calls for different theoretical approaches recognising that 
governance and its elements of security threats, security practitioners and institutions 
are constantly changing in interplay with each other. It emphasises the co-evolution 
between discourses, actors and institutions. This systems theory insight is therefore 
central to EGT. 
The systems theory has also generated some excitement over the past decade from 
scholars and practitioners in modern-day as it is strongly biological and compares 
society to biological organisms (Carroll, 1995, Leighninger, 1978). The purpose of this 
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comparison is to emphasise the interdependence, complexity and evolutionary 
adaptability of an organisation, the economies and the society as a whole. Systems 
work together and communicate with each other to create balance or homeostasis and 
each system function interacts with other systems, which then react with the 
environment and other external forces (Cordon, 2013). 
The systems theory encourages the view of things as a whole, an aspect that is widely 
appealing to cybersecurity practitioners. To understand and appreciate the need for 
the EGT approach to cybersecurity, practitioners need to accept that institutions 
change, organisations change, knowledge changes and subjects and objects of 
governance are changing as well (Van Assche et al., 2014). Systems thinking will thus 
help to see the relationship between these various players and what makes them 
produce unfavourable results and find a way to shift them into better patterns of 
behaviour (Wright and Meadows, 2009). 
Using the systems theory as a framework for evolutionary governance of cybersecurity 
will therefore not only help to facilitate sustainable changes to organisations, or 
promote the unification of cybersecurity systems and minimise the extent of damage 




Van Assche et al. (2014) acknowledge post-structuralism as a constructivist 
epistemology that depicts a manifestation and analysis of governance as a framework. 
Post-structuralism is a specific sub-variety practice of post-modernism of theory 
(Chang, 1993) that positions itself from a point of destabilisation of hierarchies of 
knowledge, ideas, meanings, categories, classification and labels to challenge 
entrenched assumptions drawn from post-structuralists ideas and conceptualisation 
of language, subjectivity and meaning (Moisander et al., 2009). Post-structuralism can 
also be understood to be based on a critique of structuralism transformation. Work by 
prominent post-structuralists such as Michel Foucault (2013) has a lot to offer in 
understanding evolutionary governance by developing substantial literature across 
different disciplines that differ in bias and accents and their proximity to other theorists 
and related disciplines.  
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The concept of EGT is also described as a set of structured concepts that enable 
access to certain aspects or parts of reality while at the same time veiling the other 
aspects (Foucault, 2013, McHoul et al., 2015). Reality as an ultimate ground or as a 
whole cannot be known. There is no denial of the existence of some things outside 
discourse but when communication, reasoning and observation are applied, that 
existence is now within discourse (Van Assche et al., 2014).  
What people do is also structured within the confines of discourse, as are executions 
of their movements and actions that are linked to discursive structures. Furthermore, 
discourses not only develop structures at different levels but also subjects, objects and 
concepts, which can migrate, return, gain prominence, lead autonomous lives and 
from a broader perspective modify discursive contexts.  
In the perspective of EGT, discourse is self-referential in that it constructs the world by 
referencing its elements and that new structures are based on prior ones. Discourses 
evolve and their transformation, which is governed by their ability to self-reference, is 
a result of the on-going processes that recursively reproduce themselves. Governance 
comprises multiple discourses that also compete and change over time, colliding and 
struggling for primacy, and then recombine and transform (Foucault, 2013, Van 
Assche et al., 2014, Eugen and Petruţ, 2018).  
 
3.4 Structuration Governance Model 
The structuration theory (ST) brings new intrinsic importance to understanding the 
post-structuralism approach to EGT. The central concept to ST is that of human 
agency, which affirms that people’s activities matter and that practice needs studying 
as it influences different outcomes (Whittington, 2015). Most significantly, as proposed 
by Giddens, the ST brings together enablement and constraints within the notion of 
both social structure and agency to not only provide flow continuity but also cater for 
possible structural change. Whittington (2015) further observed that ST encourages 
that strategy as practice and institutional theory sets a platform to work together 
through institutional embeddedness. 
The social practice concept is key as a bridging role of ST as it defines ongoing series 
of practical activities which eventually creates social systems that may exist at various 
levels such as organisational, industrial or even societal (Whittington, 2015). These 
40 
 
social systems are therefore not going to be in a deterministic loop but rather, expected 
to somewhat overlap, be contradictory or become precarious. Gorges and Grund 
(2017) observed that the pursuit of social system practices may be difficult or even 
impossible to achieve, particularly when they interfere rather than facilitate other goals 
that the individual wishes to achieve.  
Giddens further expresses that participation in multiple social systems underwrites the 
human potential as agency because they can follow one system of practices and 
refuse others, which in turn creates a large or small difference to the world 
(Whittington, 2015). Individuals may not pursue these multiple social systems 
simultaneously but multiple pursuits can be regarded as a rule rather than an 
exception (Gorges and Grund, 2017). Therefore, for people to successfully manage 
participation in multiple social systems, they would have to constantly check priorities, 
balance the allocation of resources and plan their actions. Choosing to use a firewall 
or anti-virus software in a network will not only offer internal users protection but also 
prevents external attacks. People as agencies have more knowledge about their 
practice than they can tell and they can monitor and adjust this practice to achieve 
their purpose and be effective. 
Whittington (2015) further states that agency is not only a matter of individual skill or 
will but that it is also enhanced by control resources, exercised through rejection or 
following of rules that form the structure of these social systems. Structuration 
embodies mutual dependence between agency and structure and structures are not 
fixed or given but exist only because they are instantiated in action or when people 
retain them into their memories. 
  
3.5 Evolution of Agency 
The evolution of interaction, routinization and explanation forms the cycle of 
structuration and expresses the duality of a structure as a means to replace traditional 
opposition between agency and structure through mutual dependence. The interaction 
of technologies co-shapes the society in many ways and a quasi-transcendental 
approach clarifies the classical philosophy of technology, its conditions and 
presuppositions (Verbeek, 2010). Giddens highlights three forms of agency 
interactions within the social system space and time, that is communication, the 
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exercise of power and sanction (Whittington, 2015). Thus, whenever individuals 
interact, they constantly ask questions such as (1) Why did that not happen? (2) What 
made that possible? and (3) How does that change what is possible in the future? The 
interaction of agency therefore causes a change in cybersecurity governance. 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): A change of interaction of agency leads to a change in evolution of 
cybersecurity governance. 
Routinization is concerned with the time and space of human interaction and makes 
up the foundation of social order and reproduction of social systems. These human 
interactions become routine practices that stem from skilled accomplishments of 
knowledgeable agents (Whittington, 2015). Furthermore, the smallest social actions 
may alter the reproduction of social systems since social stability and order is not 
permanent.  
Hypothesis 6 (H6): A change of routinization of agency leads to a change in evolution 
of cybersecurity governance. 
To break away from normative actions, agents must possess some form of control or 
explanation, which may effectively cause a shift in the social structure.  
Hypothesis 7 (H7): A change of explanation of agency leads to a change in evolution 
of cybersecurity governance. 
A change of agency routinization and explanation therefore has a direct effect on 
cybersecurity governance. 
 
As cyber threats are scarcely diversifying and becoming increasingly sophisticated, 
affecting an increasing number of users and organisations, the solution to 
cybersecurity governance thus requires a unified and coordinated approach at the 
organisational, regional and global level. As a result, the researcher’s proposed 
conceptual model integrates EGT, structuration/structuralism theory and agency, in an 





Figure 10: The proposed post structuralism/structuration cybersecurity governance 
model 
 
3.6 Chapter 3 – Summary 
This chapter explored the different theories and models of evolutionary governance. 
The philosophical stance adopted by the researcher is, therefore, that of a positivist 
and explores social reality based on the idea that we can understand human behaviour 
through the objective (and not subjective) observation and reason as described by 
both the structuration and systems theories. This is also a key factor in this current 
study since the researcher’s aim is to determine how changes in various factors affect 
the governance of cybersecurity. The evolutionary perspective is necessary because 
it affects governance arrangements, which are influenced by the dynamics of 
institutions, actors, agencies and discourses. Without proper consideration of the 
evolution, existing information security policies will contradict and eventually become 
ineffective. People’s activities within organisations matter and if combined with 
structure, it brings a flow of continuity and also possible structural change. Finally, this 
chapter highlighted the importance of the social practice of ongoing series of practical 
 
Evolution of Technolog Evolution of Threats 
Evolution of Institutional 
Goals 
 Evolution of 
Cybersecurity Governance 
Evolution of Interaction Evolution of Routinization Evolution of Explanation 
H2 
H1 
H6 H5 H7 
H4 
H3 
Evolution of Agency 
43 
 





























CHAPTER 4: Research Methodology 
This chapter describes how this research is achieved by first outlining the research 
concepts that are associated with the evolution of cybersecurity governance. 
Research types such as qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods are described in 
this chapter and later compared to determine which would be suitable for this study. 
Importantly, the chapter also discusses a variety of strategies and sampling 
techniques associated with these research types. The chapter then evaluates these 
research models and approaches by incorporating their associated research designs. 
The chapter concludes by selecting the preferred research approaches based on the 




The natural tendency of the researcher is to select a method for gathering data to get 
the research done and the choice of methods is influenced by the chosen research 
methodology. The methodology, in turn, is influenced by the theoretical perspectives 
that the researcher adopts, that is, whether the research is inclined towards 
interpretivist, positivist or other perspectives, and that, in turn, is also influenced by the 
epistemological stance taken by the researcher (Gray, 2013). This is illustrated in 
Figure 11 below. 
 
Figure 11: Elements of the Research Process (Source: (Gray, 2013) 
Creswell (2003) describes methodology as the process of studying knowledge. Data 
stands in place of the reality that individuals wish to study. As such, a phenomenon 
cannot simply be known but attempts can be made to capture it as data, representing 
a reality that has been experienced and that one is trying to explain (Goertzen, 2017). 
The nature of the research needs to be understood to put value into this research. 
Appropriate methods must be carefully selected to ensure a proper analysis of the 
research problem. Although all research serves a specific purpose, the general aim is 
to discover hidden answers to questions using scientific procedures by obtaining the 




4.2 Research Concept 
The concept of research is about creating new knowledge and thus conducting 
research follows a logical consequence to the question that has emerged but has not 
yet been answered (Graue, 2015). Research is also further defined as follows: (1) a 
scientific and systematic search for pertinent information on a specific topic; (2) a 
systematised effort to gain new knowledge; or (3) a careful inquiry or investigation 
especially through the search for new facts in any branch of knowledge (Kothari, 2004, 
Kumar, 2019). Robson and McCartan (2016) define research as the process of making 
claims that are then abandoned or refined in the light of the evidence that is always 
imperfect or fallible. For a researcher, starting a knowledge claim means that they start 
a project with certain assumptions about how and what they will learn during the 
research (Creswell, 2003). It is import to also understand that research can either 
further analyse an already examined phenomenon or approach a completely new one. 
The philosophy of the research has a huge impact on the role of the researcher and if 
quantitative research is unrewarding to answer the question, the choice will be 
qualitative research. Research design is influenced by methods, methodology and 
philosophy which make up the design’s components, as shown in Figure 12 below. 
 
Figure 12: Components of Research Design (Source: (Graue, 2015) 
The philosophy consists of epistemology and ontology and combined with methods 
and methodology, they affect the role of the researcher in conducting the research. 
Ontology is the study of being, that is, the nature of existence and what constitutes 
reality. (Gray, 2013) also makes claims about what knowledge is and influences how 
the research is conducted, the research objectives and the research questions 
(Creswell, 2003, Graue, 2015). 
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Epistemology addresses the nature, origins, limits and methods of human knowledge 
with more focus on the questions and nature of the knowledge itself and it can either 
be objectivist or subjectivist knowledge embedded in theoretical perspectives (Gray, 
2013). Ontology, on the other hand, is a branch of philosophy that addresses “what 
exists”, being or reality and a theoretical perspective is an approach that takes a 
philosophical stance such as positivism, post-positivism, critical theory or 
interpretivism (Schuh and Barab, 2007). Also, the emphasis is put on measuring and 
analysing causal relationships between isolated variables within a value-free, 
reductionist, logical and deterministic framework that is based on a priori theories 
(Yilmaz, 2013). Figure 13 below illustrates the relationship that exists between 
research methods, methodology, theoretical perspectives and epistemology. 
 
Figure 13: Relationship Between Epistemology, Theoretical Perspectives, 
Methodology and Research Methods (Source: (Gray, 2013) 
Objectivist epistemology states that there is an objective reality “out there”, meaning 
that reality exists independently of consciousness; hence the reason for the research 
is to discover this object that truth suggests (Gray (2013). In doing so, researchers do 
not include their values and feelings but ought to be able to study people’s subjective 
values, attitudes and beliefs objectively. Positivism is another theoretical perspective 
closely linked to objectivism and argues that external to the researcher there is a reality 
that exists that must be investigated through the rigorous scientific inquiry process, as 
stated by Gray (2013). Constructivism, also referred to as interpretivism, in contrast, 
declares that meaning and truth do not exist in some external world but rather are 
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created by the subject’s interactions with the world. Furthermore, subjectivism does 
not emerge from the interplay between the outside world and the subject, but is 
imposed by the subject on the object (Gray, 2013, Robson and McCartan, 2016). 
 
4.3 Research Types 
4.3.1 Quantitative Research 
Quantitative research is defined as research that explains a phenomenon based on 
numerical data, which is then analysed using statistical mathematical methods 
(Yilmaz, 2013, Goertzen, 2017). In broader terms, this type of research is empirical 
research on a social phenomenon or human problem and tests a theory with 
numerically measurable variables and is analysed statistically to determine if the 
theory predicts or explains the phenomenon of interest. Hjalmarson and Moskal (2018) 
identify the fundamental goal of quantitative research as that of making a convincing 
argument based on numerical data in response to a research question. The important 
component is, therefore, to recognise that because data is not numeric in their natural 
state, this process models phenomena using evidence that has been mapped onto a 
quantitative framework for analysis. As a result, one of the central goals of quantitative 
research is to build accurate and reliable measurements (Goertzen, 2017). 
Quantitative research is very effective at answering the “what” and “how” questions of 
a given situation because it focuses on data that can be measured (Goertzen, 2017, 
Barnham, 2015). Such questions are quantifiable, direct and often contain such 
phrases as “how much?”, “how many?”, “what proportion?”, or “what percentage?” 
Quantitative research allows researchers to explain what is known anecdotally or to 
document trends by using measurements like frequencies, proportions, percentages 
and relationships to provide the means to quantify and provide evidence, explains 
Goertzen (2017).  
 
4.3.2 Qualitative Research 
Qualitative research is difficult to define because of its multifaceted nature that is 
underpinned by different paradigms (Yilmaz, 2013). Qualitative studies are concerned 
with interpretation, context, understanding or meaning through inductive reasoning. 
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This type of research is used when a more in-depth understanding of consumer 
motivations, attitude and behaviour is required, in particular, to get answers to the 
“why?” motivational research questions that reference its emergence and that suggest 
that the researcher can get “deeper” understanding through such further interrogative 
strategies (Barnham, 2015). Such research is aimed at discovering and understanding 
the phenomena studied by capturing and communicating the underlying desires, 
motives and participant’s experiences in their own words using in-depth interviews or 
via observation (Yilmaz, 2013). Qualitative research also includes opinion or attitude 
research because it is designed to find out what people think or how they feel about a 
particular institution or subject (Kothari, 2004). The involvement of the researcher is 
larger in qualitative research and thus makes the researcher understand the point of 
view of the subject of the study much better (Graue, 2015).  
Qualitative research is particularly important in behavioural sciences where the 
discovery of underlying human behaviour motives is key. Also, Kothari (2004) 
mentions that it is through such research that the researcher can analyse the various 
factors that make people dislike or like something, or motivate people to behave in a 
particular manner. The process of qualitative data analysis involves descriptions, 
interconnections and classifications of phenomena with the researcher’s concepts. 
 
4.3.3 Mixed Methods 
In research, there is hardly a single approach that can always and in all situations 
accurately find answers to all of the study’s research questions. In some situations, 
different methods may need to be used for different research questions or objectives 
of the study (Kumar, 2019). Additionally, in some situations, one data source may be 
insufficient; there is a need for a theoretical stance to be employed; results need to be 
explained; a generalisation of exploratory findings is needed; a second method to 
enhance a primary method is also needed; or simply that the overall research objective 
can be best addressed using multiple projects or phases, argues Kumar (2019). The 
mixed-methods research has emerged as a separate approach in the past decade 
and it is based on the assumption that for certain situations, the researcher may need 
to use more than one method from one paradigm to have a complete perception of the 
situation and to confirm findings (Kumar, 2019).  
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The mixed-methods approach disregards any existing theoretical orientation in favour 
of a sound mix of quantitative and qualitative data in the study of human behaviour 
and thought. Simply put, Kumar (2019) further states that mixed methods are an 
approach rather than a philosophy to a social enquiry that implements two or more 
philosophies, processes or methods to undertake a research study in major areas of 
behavioural and social sciences to enhance the accuracy of their findings.  
Further investigation by Kumar (2019) concerning the definition of the mixed-method 
study identified two opinions. The first one advocates that the two methods used must 
be from both the quantitative and qualitative paradigms, whilst the second suggests 
that a study using two methods is already considered as a mixed-methods study even 
if both methods are from the same paradigm. Also, other authors believe that the two 
or more methods the study uses could come from either or both paradigms for that 
study to be classified as a mixed-methods study, as illustrated in Figure 14 below.  
  
Figure 14: Typology of Mixed-Methods Research Based on the Degree of 
Combination and Status (Source: (Bentahar and Cameron, 2015) 
Furthermore, concerning the limitations experienced by all study methods, 
researchers felt that biases inherent in any one of the methods could potentially 
neutralise or cancel the biases of other methods, therefore enriching and enhancing 
the reliability, validity and accuracy of the findings (Creswell, 2003, Kumar, 2019). This 
signalled the birth of triangulation of data sources, a means that seeks to converge 
data from a variety of sources and applying a variety of methods (Graue, 2015, Cowles 
and Nelson, 2015). Using triangulation, the researcher can use one measurement 
process and compare the findings with those of the other methods. If the findings of 
the second method concur with those of the first, triangulation provides insight into a 
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different unit of analysis and strengthens the reliability of the findings (Creswell, 2003). 
However, if the findings vary, it is then proof that using one method for the study is not 
enough (Graue, 2015). Methodological triangulation is possible if methods such as 
interviews, case studies and surveys are used in combination to balance out potential 
weaknesses in each data collection method (Gray, 2013). 
 
4.3.4 Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed-Methods Comparisons 
How qualitative and quantitative research are conventionally contrasted with each 
other runs along the lines that the latter is perceived as offering “hard”, “factual” data 
whilst the former is depicted as “softer” and providing deeper insight, though at the 
expense of being more “interpretive” and “subjective” in its approach (Barnham, 2015). 
The difference further lies in their underpinnings in terms of ontology, theoretical, 
methodical and epistemological underpinnings. Creswell (2003) describes the two 
approaches by using different philosophical assumptions concerning the nature of 
reality, such as epistemology, ontology, the rhetoric of research and values. Unlike 
qualitative research, quantitative research uses objectivist epistemology that seeks to 
develop and explain social behaviours by using statistic measurements of what is 
assumed to be a static reality (Yilmaz, 2013).  
In quantitative research, social and psychological views are endorsed as having an 
objective reality that does not depend on the subjects under study, implying that the 
researcher and subjects are viewed as independent and separate entities and that 
studies are done objectively by the researcher from a distance, argues Yilmaz (2013). 
Qualitative research, on the other hand, is identified by the post-positivistic, 
constructionist, post-structural and critical paradigms as the basis for the 
methodological, epistemological and ontological underpinnings, declares Yilmaz 
(2013). Also, qualitative research is a relativist ontology (whose notion of multiple 
realities is accepted), subjectivist epistemology (created through understanding that 
the knower and unknown (subject) interact), and neutralist (subjects are studied within 
neutral settings) (Yilmaz, 2013). Table 2 below illustrates common differences 
between quantitative, qualitative and mixed-methods studies. 
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Table 2: Quantitative Research versus Qualitative Research versus Mixed Methods 
(Source: (Creswell, 2003). 
The use of more than one method or paradigm and different sources in mixed methods 
to derive data instils higher confidence in the results. However, critics find fault with 
the mixed approach because it cannot be compared to others since it uses different 
methods, explains Graue (2015). Another problem is that it is more costly to the 
researcher due to the workload associated with the administration of multiple different 
research methods, and grasping both approaches and seeing how they complement 
each other takes more time and effort of the researcher (Graue, 2015, Neuman, 2014). 
 
4.4 Research Strategies 
Research strategies are traditions of enquiry that provide a specific direction for the 
research design procedures (Creswell, 2003). These strategies have increased in 
number over the years and have been driven by the ability of computer technology to 
push for the analysis of complex models and the articulation of new procedures by 
individuals to conduct social science research. Table 3 below gives an overview of the 
common strategies. 
Research Design Strategies 
 
Quantitative Qualitative Mixed Methods 
Experimental Designs Ethnography Sequential 
Non-experimental designs, 
such as Surveys 
Case Studies Concurrent 
 Phenomenological Research Transformative 
 Narratives Research  
Table 3: Research Strategies 
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4.5 Strategies Associated with the Quantitative Approach 
Research strategies associated with quantitative research are those that invoked the 
post-positivism perspective and include surveys and experiments. 
 
4.5.1 Experiments 
Experiments may be categorised in several ways. Firstly, they can be distinguished 
between the randomised and non-randomised assignment of participants or whether 
they are true experiments versus quasi-experiments (Bernard and Bernard, 2013). In 
true experiments, the assignment of participants (subjects) is random being either a 
control group or treatment group, whereas in quasi-experiments, participants are 
selected rather than assigned. 
Bernard and Bernard (2013) further acknowledge that experiments can also be 
categorised in terms of where they are done, that is, out in the world or in the 
laboratory. In comparison, field experiments offer greater realism, whereas lab 
experiments offer greater control. Regardless of the type of experiment chosen, the 
logic is the same, no matter where they are done, declare Bernard and Bernard (2013). 
 
4.5.2 Surveys 
The concept of a survey involves identifying a specific category or group of people and 
collecting information from some of them to generalise from the sample to gain an 
insight of the entire group (De Leeuw et al., 2012). In a survey, quantitative information 
is systematically collected from a relatively large sample taken from a population using 
structured interviews or questionnaires. Surveys can be longitudinal and cross-
sectional studies (Creswell, 2003). Cross-sectional studies refer to a survey given at 
one point in time and only once to a particular sample of respondents, whereas a 
longitudinal study involves surveying and pursuing the same respondents over a 
lengthy period (Nardi, 2018). 
To research the survey strategy, the research questions have to be delivered to 
potential respondents using face-to-face delivery, mailed delivery, telephone delivery, 
web delivery or variations of new technological advances in the form of computer-
assisted self-interviewing techniques (Cowles and Nelson, 2015). 
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4.6 Strategies Associated with the Qualitative Approach 
4.6.1 Ethnography 
Ethnography is the extension of field research built on the social constructionist 
perspective that aims to provide descriptions of people and/or their culture (Neuman, 
2014). In ethnography, the researcher studies an intact cultural group by collecting 
observational and primary data in their natural setting over some time. Creswell (2003) 
describes this as a flexible process that evolves contextually in response to 
encountered realities in that field setting. Neuman (2014) further mentions that 
ethnography emphasises that it is important to provide detailed descriptions of 
different cultures from an insider’s point of view to facilitate understanding. Thus, the 
use of ethnography not only helps to describe people’s lives and behaviour but also 
helps infer the meaning of beliefs and thoughts that reside behind the behaviour 
(Neuman, 2014). The goal of ethnography is, therefore, to move from what the 
researcher can easily observe from the outside to what the people being observed 
truly feel and mean internally. 
 
4.6.2 Case Study 
Most case studies are qualitative, in which the researcher performs an in-depth 
exploration of an event, process, activity, programme, organisation, geographical units 
or individual (Neuman, 2014). The collected data is detailed, extensive and varied and 
can span a single point in time or a sustained period, focusing on each case’s internal 
features and the surrounding situation. 
 
4.6.3 Phenomenological Research 
Phenomenological research is when the researcher identifies the “essence” of human 
experience regarding a phenomenon as study participants would describe it (Creswell, 
2003). Phenomenology is a philosophy and a method marked by understanding “lived 
experiences”, whose procedure involves extensive and prolonged engagements of 
studying a small number of participants to develop patterns and relationship of 
meaning, Creswell (2003) further claims. As a result, the researcher in this process 
“brackets” their experience to understand those of the participants being studied.  
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4.6.4 Narrative Research 
Narrative research is based on enquiry in which the researcher studies the lives of 
individuals by asking one or more individuals to tell stories about their lives (Creswell, 
2003). These narratives are a type of qualitative data, both rhetorical and generic in 
form, that discuss and present data as a kind of theoretical explanation that merges 
theorised descriptions of events with its explanations, as Neuman (2014) observed. 
Also, Creswell (2003) acknowledges that these stories are then retold by the 
researcher into a narrative chronology, eventually combining the views in a 
collaborative narrative from the participant’s life with those of the researcher’s life. 
 
4.7 Strategies Associated with the Mixed-Methods Approach 
Neuman (2014) acknowledges that a study that combines both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches is richer and more comprehensive. Such mixing occurs by 
using a sequential approach, parallel or simultaneous approach, or using the first one 
then the other, Neuman (2014) suggests. 
 
4.7.1 Sequential 
Using the sequential mixed-methods approach, the researcher seeks to elaborate on 
the findings of one method using another (Creswell, 2003). The researcher may begin 
the study with exploration using a qualitative method and then follow up with a 
quantitative method with a large sample that can be used to generalise the results to 
a population. Alternatively, a quantitative method may be used at the beginning of the 
study to test theories and concepts and then followed by a qualitative method that 
involves a detailed exploration of a few cases (Creswell, 2003). 
 
4.7.2 Concurrent  
In this procedure, the researcher converges qualitative and quantitative data to provide 
a comprehensive analysis of the research problem. As Creswell (2003) mentions, the 
researcher collects both forms of data simultaneously during the study and then 
integrates the information to interpret the results. Also, the research may nest the 
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smaller form of data to another, larger data collection procedure to analyse different 
levels of units or questions in an organisation. 
 
4.7.3 Transformative 
When the researcher uses a theoretical lens as an overarching perspective in a design 
that contains both quantitative and qualitative data, the procedure is said to be 
transformative (Creswell, 2003). The lens provides a framework for methods of 
collecting the data, topics of interest, changes or outcomes anticipated by the study. 
The lens could also contain a data collection method that involves a concurrent or 
sequential approach (Creswell, 2003). 
 
4.8 Data Collection Methods 
To carry out this study, it is necessary to collect appropriate data. There are several 
ways available and these differ in terms of resources needed, money costs and time 
available to the researcher. Experiments and surveys may be used to collect primary 
data and in the case of experiments, the researcher observes some quantitative data 
or measurements to examine the truth contained in the hypothesis (Kothari, 2004). 
However, in the case of a survey, data may be collected using any of the below 
methods and taking into consideration the objectives and scope of the inquiry, 
available time, financial resources, the desired degree of accuracy and the nature of 
the investigation, as acknowledged by Kothari (2004). 
 
4.8.1 Mail and Self-Administered Questionnaires 
The questionnaire is given or emailed directly to the respondents, who read the 
instructions, record their answers and return it after completion (Neuman, 2014, 
Kothari, 2004). The respondent can complete the questionnaire at their convenience, 
choose to be anonymous and can refer to personal records if necessary. 
Questionnaires are the most extensively used method in business and economic 
surveys because they are not only effective but also achieve acceptable response 
rates (Neuman, 2014). However, many people do not complete and return mail 
questionnaires, hence the biggest problem with this method is low response rate, 
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argues Neuman (2014). Also, the researcher lacks control of the conditions under 
which the questionnaire is completed. This means a questionnaire completed during 
a drinking party may be returned along with one completed by an earnest respondent 
(Neuman, 2014). Furthermore, no one is present to probe or clarify the respondents’ 
answers, or even observe the respondents’ reactions to questions. 
 
4.8.2 Interviews 
Interviews as a data collection method can either be face to face or telephone-based. 
The researcher follows a rigid, structured way to seek answers to a set of predefined 
questions and also, to a large extent, the output depends on the researcher’s 
interviewing skills (Kothari, 2004). In telephone interviews, the interviewer calls the 
respondents, asks the questions and writes down the answers. Although the response 
rate is relatively high, a telephone interview is more expensive than a mail 
questionnaire. Most researchers now resort to the use of computer-assisted 
technologies, such as computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) and 
interactive voice response (IVR) to conduct telephone interviews (Neuman, 2014). 
 
4.8.3 Observation 
Using the method of observation, the researcher does not interview respondents but 
rather information is collected by way of the researcher’s observation (Kothari, 2004). 
Information obtained in this manner is not affected by either the past, behaviours or 
future attitudes of respondents but relates to what is happening currently. This method 
is no doubt expensive and provides limited information and is thus not suitable for 
large samples, Kothari (2004) observes. 
 
4.8.4 Web Surveys 
Widespread access to the internet in the last decade has contributed to a 
corresponding growth in the use of web-based or email surveys. Neuman (2014) 
argues that web-based surveys are not only fast and inexpensive but also offer a 
flexible design to use visual images, audio as well as video. Web surveys can be static, 
like presenting a page of paper but on a computer screen, or interactive, containing 
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contingency questions that may be presented to different respondents depending on 
prior answers (Neuman, 2014). 
  
4.9 Data Sampling 
The researcher must decide on how to select a sample before any data is collected 
from a given population. All items under consideration in a survey study constitute a 
“population” and the selection of only a few items from the population for study 
purposes is called “sampling” (Kothari, 2004). Samples can either be probability 
samples, where each element has a known probability of being chosen in the sample, 
or non-probability samples, in which case the researcher cannot determine this 
probability, Kothari (2004) notes. Table 4 below summarises some important sample 
designs. 
 
Sample Design  Technique Description 
1. Deliberate sampling Non-probability Involves purposive or deliberate 
selection of particular units of 
the universe for constituting a 
sample which represents the 
universe. 
2. Simple random sampling Probability  Also known as chance 
sampling or probability 
sampling where every item in 
the population has an equal 
chance of inclusion in the 
sample. 
3. Systematic sampling Probability Sampling involving the 
selection of every 15th name on 
the list or every 10th house. 
4. Stratified Sampling Probability The population is stratified into 
several non-overlapping 
subpopulations or strata and 
sample items are selected from 
each stratum. 
5. Quota sampling  Non-probability Interviewers are simply given a 
quota to be filled from different 
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strata, the actual selection of 
items for the sample being left 
to the interviewer’s judgement. 
6. Cluster sampling and area 
sampling 
Probability Involves grouping the 
population and then selecting 
the groups or the clusters rather 
than individual elements for 
inclusion in the sample. 
7. Multi-stage sampling Probability This technique uses the idea of 
cluster sampling and is meant 
for big inquiries extending to a 
considerably large 
geographical area like an entire 
country. 
8. Sequential Sampling Non-probability Somewhat complex sample 
design where the ultimate size 
of the sample is not fixed in 
advance but is determined 
according to mathematical 
decisions based on information 
yielded as the survey 
progresses. 
Table 4: Sampling Designs (Source: (Kothari, 2004). 
 
4.10 Selected Research Study Approaches and Strategies 
4.10.1 Research Methodology 
“In this study, quantitative research was used. The decision to follow a quantitative 
research approach lies in the objectivists' epistemological belief that seeks to explain 
social behaviour and employs statistical tools to measure what it assumes as static in 
reality. The researcher further believes that epistemology endorses both social and 
psychological views as having an objective reality that does not depend on the 
subjects under study, that subjects are viewed as independent and separate entities 
and that studies are done objectively by the researcher from a distance.”  
Further reason for choosing to use quantitative research is that the process models 
phenomena using evidence mapped onto a quantitative framework for further analysis. 
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Using quantitative methods also demonstrates evidence for trends relating to the 
prevalence of cyber-attacks on organisations and proves anecdotally that if 
cybersecurity is not discussed at board level as an enterprise risk management issue 
organisations will continue to suffer from these attacks (Goertzen, 2017) 
Quantitative research is also preferred in this study because it focuses not only on 
measurable data but also because it is effective in answering the quantifiable “what” 
and “how” types of questions that form the basis of the research problem. 
Also, as illustrated by Hjalmarson and Moskal (2018), using quantitative research in 
this study will make convincing arguments based on numerical data as a fundamental 
goal in response to the research questions that have been formulated. 
  
4.10.2 Selected Research Design and Data Tools 
A survey has been chosen as the preferred research method for this study. Although 
the researcher targeted a higher number of responses, and because of time 
constraints, a random choice of the first 160 responses was deemed sufficient for this 
study. They were asked the same questions to measure many variables related to 
cybersecurity governance and then the multiple hypotheses that have been designed 
are tested. Using the survey, the study also statistically analyses the various 
associations amongst variables to identify the causal relationships. In the case of 
missing data, the researcher chooses to automatically exclude it from analysis if it 
makes up a small percentage. As illustrated in Figure 15 below, the survey research 
proceeds deductively, first conceptualising the variables and then operationalising 




Figure 15: Steps in the Process of Survey Research 
4.10.3 Selected Data Collection Tool 
A survey mail with a web link and self-administered questionnaire is used as the 
instrument in this research as it is cheaper. A collection of survey questions are 
organised and grouped in sequence to form the questionnaire as described in section 
5.2.1 in Chapter 5. The Web‐based questionnaire would be used for data collection. 
An online link to the google form questionnaire will be sent to prospective participants. 
When the participants are done at the end, they will click the submit button. The 
responses will be viewed from the spreadsheet which is linked to the google form for 
further analysis. 
The questions will infer temporal order about past, present and future structural 
behaviour, experiences, characteristics and attitudes of cybersecurity elements based 
on the proposed EGT framework. Respondents read the questionnaire and mark the 
63 
 
answers themselves. The research also pilot-tests the questionnaire with a selected 
small group of respondents who are similar to those in the final survey. 
 
4.11 Chapter 4 – Conclusion 
The research methodology chapter indicated how the research is carried out, including 
the creation, testing and distribution of the research instrument. Various approaches 
are explained and the appropriate one is chosen and reasons given for the choice of 
this particular methodology. This is to ensure that the methodology fits into the goal of 
the research and appropriate responses collected to provide answers to the research 





CHAPTER 5: Data Analysis 
This chapter outlines the critical quantitative analysis and interpretation of data 
collected in this study. The chapter first evaluates the quality of this research by 
performing reliability and validity tests to determine consistency and accuracy of 
measurements respectively. The chapter also provides details of the relationship 
between indicators and factors identified in the evolutionary cybersecurity government 
model, in the form of variance and rotated component matrix. Importantly, the chapter 
demonstrates an in-depth interpretation of regression analysis such as coefficients 
from the outputs, model summary table outputs, statistical significance of the model 
from an ANOVA table and statistical significance of the independent variables from 





Data analysis is important in that it assists the researcher to apply statistical tests to 
the data collected to help answer the research questions that were formulated at the 
begging of the research. The better the execution of data analysis, the stronger the 
research conclusion. Through data analysis, the researcher can test and describe the 
relationship between the various elements that influence the governance of 
cybersecurity. In this chapter, descriptive statistics are performed to analyse the 
demographic data, which is helpful to understand the different types of respondents 
that participated in the survey. Also, various constructs of the research are analysed 
to provide a general overview of responses provided and to allow for easier 
comparisons and interpretation of the results. Furthermore, this chapter analyses and 
tests the validity and reliability of the questionnaire to ensure that it is consistent. This 
is necessary to ensure the credibility of the data collected from the sample. Factor 
analysis is also performed and the results assessed to reflect variance and the rotated 
components matrix. Finally, various constructs are then tested by performing 
regression and correlation tests to examine their relationship. 
 
5.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics measure the different aspects of the sample to analyse and 
compare the results. The sections below present and analyse the respondents’ 
demographic information to explore relationships among the items identified in the 
study. Various datasets are also compared using cross-tabulation to identify patterns 
and relationships. 
 
5.2.1 Demographic Details 
Section A of the questionnaire sought to collect details of participants that relate to 
their background, such as gender, age, level of education and details about their 
organisations. The results, therefore, highlight whether the respondents are qualified 
and have sufficient experience in the cybersecurity governance space.  
This research used a questionnaire that was divided into five sections. Section A seeks 
to obtain participants’ demographics while sections B, C, D, and E focused on the 
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evolution of technology, the evolution of cybersecurity threats, the evolution of 
institutional goals, and the evolution of agency respectively. Section A consisted of 
nominal scale-based questions while Section B to Section E all used a 5 
point Likert scale to measure the level of agreement with the given statements, that 
is: Strongly agree, Agree, Neutral, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree. 





Figure 16: Gender 
Figure 16 above illustrates the gender distribution from the sample size of 160 
respondents who participated in the survey. The figure shows that males contributed 
78.8% of the sample, 18.8% were females, and 2.4% of the respondents preferred to 
not mention their gender. This shows that males are still the dominant gender in the 
workplace in corporate South Africa. 
Age 




Figure 17: Age 
The majority of participants were between the ages of 25 and 34, representing 53.8% 
of the respondents, with 32.5% in the age group of 35 to 44. This indicates the age 
groups of the most experienced respondents, which is a factor in this study. The rest 
of the age distribution is as follows: 5.6% of the respondents were between 18 and 24, 
7.5% were between 45 and 54, and 0.6% were above the age of 55. 
 
Level of Education 
The respondents were asked to indicate their highest level of education and the results 
are depicted in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18: Level of Education 
These results show that the majority of the respondents had a diploma (21.9%), 
bachelor’s degree (24.4%), honours degree (23.8%) and master’s degree (21.9%). It 
is therefore clear that most respondents possess a tertiary qualification, which is 
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significant in this research. The remainder of the distribution is as follows: respondents 
with certificates (7.5%) and those with doctoral degrees made up only 0.6%. 
 
The Number of Employees in Your Organisation 
The size in terms of the number of employees within the respondents’ organisations 
is illustrated in Figure 19 below. 
 
Figure 19: Number of Employees in the Organisation 
The results show that the majority of the respondents work in organisations that 
employ 1 000 or more employees (41.9%), whereas 23.8% of the respondents work 
in organisations that have between 100 and 499 employees. The remainder of the 
distribution includes 18.8% of respondents who work for an organisation with one to 
49 employees, 8.8% for an organisation with 500 to 999 employees, and 7.5% for an 
organisation with 50 to 99 employees. 
 
Cross-tabulation  
The relationship between respondents’ job title and their years of experience in cyber-
security governance was assessed to determine where the majority of respondents 
fell concerning both aspects. The results are displayed in Table 5 below. 
 
What is your current position/role/job title? * How many years of experience do you 
have in cyber-security governance? Cross tabulation. 
 
How many years of experience do you have in cyber-



















Security Analyst 14 7 9 2 0 0 32 
Cybersecurity 
Engineer 
7 9 4 2 1 0 23 
IT Director 1 0 2 1 2 1 7 
IT Manager 3 5 1 2 0 0 11 
CISO/CSO 0 2 1 1 1 0 5 
Systems 
Administrator 
6 1 0 0 0 0 7 
Network Engineer 16 3 1 0 0 0 20 
IT Auditor 9 4 2 0 0 0 15 
Systems 
Engineer 
11 3 1 0 0 0 15 
IT Specialist 6 3 1 3 0 1 14 
IT Analyst 6 0 0 0 0 0 6 
Support 
Technician 
5 0 0 0 0 0 5 
Total 84 37 22 11 4 2 160 
Table 5: Cross-tabulation between job title and years of experience in cybersecurity 
governance 
When comparing the respondents’ level of experience with their current job 
description, the data shows that most respondents are network engineers with zero to 
three years of experience in cybersecurity governance. On second were the security 
analysts followed by the systems engineers, both also with between zero and three 
years of experience in cybersecurity governance. Cybersecurity engineers produced 
most of the respondents with four to seven years of experience and also produced the 
second-highest number of total respondents in the survey after security analysts. The 
least number of respondents belonged to support technicians and CISO/CSO with 
zero to three years’ of experience and between four and seven years and 16 to 19 
years’ experience respectively. Cross-tabulation between years of experience and job 
title not only provides information about the respondents’ job descriptions but also the 
amount of knowledge the respondents have concerning cybersecurity governance in 
those roles. This is significant in this research as it ascertains that the data collected 
is from respondents who are knowledgeable concerning cybersecurity governance 




5.2.2 Evolution of Technology 
This section aims to measure the respondents’ knowledge regarding the two attributes 
of technology and how it relates to the governance of cybersecurity. The results 
obtained are shown in the data below.  
Evolution of Technology 
Evolution of technology in the governance of cybersecurity seeks to acquire 
respondents’ opinions relating to the evolution of some technological innovations. The 
four aspects used to measure technology include cloud computing, the Internet of 
Things (IoT), IT-based security solutions and related integration tools. The results are 
summarised in Figure 20 below and each bar represents a percentage value of the 
number of respondents. The total value of the bars for each statement is equal to 
100%. 
 
Figure 20: Evolution of Technology 
Concerning cloud computing and IoT, Figure 20 above illustrates that 66.9% of the 
respondents strongly agreed that the technologies have evolved over the years and 
30.6% agreed with the statement. Concerning cybersecurity tools and technologies 
having evolved over the years, 58.1% of the respondents strongly agreed, while 39.4% 
agreed with the statement. Concerning IT-based security solutions, 64.4% strongly 
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agreed that technology has evolved over the years, while 31.9% agreed. Most 
respondents (58.1%) also strongly agreed that ideas and lessons to integrate IT-based 
technology have evolved over the years and 38.1% agreed. Furthermore, 31.3% of 
respondents also agreed that IT-based technology has evolved over the years whilst 
68.1% strongly agreed.  
Based on these results, it is noted that most respondents agreed that these 
technologies have evolved over the years and hence impacted on their cybersecurity 
governance. The means and standard deviation values for the evolution of technology 
are shown in Table 6 below. 
Standard Deviation Values 
Evolution of Technology Mean Std. Deviation 
 
IT-based technology has evolved over the years. 1.33 .483 
Ideas and lessons to integrate IT-based technology have evolved 
over the years. 
1.46 .570 
IT-based security solutions have evolved over the years. 1.41 .638 
Cybersecurity tools and technologies have evolved over the 
years. 
1.46 .602 
Cloud computing and the Internet of things have evolved over the 
years. 
1.36 .530 
Table 6: Evolution of Technology Standard Deviation Values 
Table 6 above shows the high standard deviation values, which reflect that the 
numbers are more spread out. 
 
Evolution of Cybersecurity Governance 
Evolution of cybersecurity governance measures the degree to which it has evolved 
over the years from a technology point of view. Technological aspects used to 
measure this construct include automation, artificial intelligence, dashboards and 
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cloud-based solutions. Table 7 below provides a summary of results to responses on 
the evolution of cybersecurity governance. 
 
Strongly 
agree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Growth in automation 
technology has provided 
reliable cybersecurity 
governance. 
48.8% 35.0% 12.5% 3.8% 0.0% 
Artificial intelligence 
growth has provided 
cybersecurity 
governance. 
28.1% 53.1% 15.0% 3.8% 0.0% 
Growth in scalable 
security dashboards has 
enhanced the status of 
cybersecurity 
governance. 
30.0% 59.4% 8.1% 2.5% 0.0% 
Growth in cloud-based 
solutions has made 
cybersecurity governance 
effective. 
40.6% 42.5% 11.9% 3.1% 1.9% 
Growth in investments in 
automation technologies 
has created successful 
cybersecurity 
governance. 
40.0% 45.0% 9.4% 5.0% 0.6% 
Table 7: Evolution of Cybersecurity Governance 
Based on the results in Table 7, 48.8% strongly agreed and 35.0% simply agreed that 
the growth in automation has provided reliable cybersecurity governance. Also, the 
majority agreed that growth in artificial intelligence has provided a solution to 
cybersecurity governance, 28.1% strongly agree and 53.1% agree.  
Concerning scalable security dashboards, 59.4% agreed with the statement, while 
30.0% strongly agreed. The results for growth in investments in automation reflected 
40.0% for those who strongly agreed and 45.0% in favour of those who agreed. In 
summary, based on the results, the majority of respondents seem to agree that the 
mentioned technologies have a direct impact on the governance of cybersecurity. 
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The means and standard deviation values for the evolution of cybersecurity 
governance are shown in Table 8 below. 
 
Standard Deviation Values 
Evolution of Cybersecurity Governance Mean Std. Deviation 
 
Growth in automation technology has provided reliable 
cybersecurity governance. 
1.71 .827 
Artificial intelligence growth has provided cybersecurity 
governance. 
1.94 .763 
Growth in scalable security dashboards has enhanced the status 
of cybersecurity governance. 
1.83 .675 
Growth in cloud-based solutions has made cybersecurity 
governance effective. 
1.83 .892 
Growth in investments in automation technologies has created 
successful cybersecurity governance. 
1.81 .848 
Table 8: Evolution of Cybersecurity Governance Standard Deviation Values 
As shown in Table 8 above, the standard deviation values are high, which reflects that 
the numbers are more spread out. 
 
5.2.3 Evolution of Cybersecurity Threats 
Evolution of cybersecurity threats plays a significant role in shaping mechanisms that 
aid in the governance of cybersecurity. The factors that were used to measure this 
construct are data warnings, threat targets and threat volumes. The results of the 
evolution of cybersecurity threats are illustrated in Figure 21 below and each bar 




Figure 21: Evolution of Cybersecurity Threats 
The results in Figure 21 show that 38.1% of the respondents agreed that the 
cybersecurity administration workforce is now faced with an expanded number of 
assaults, while 56.3% strongly agreed. The data further shows that the majority of 
respondents (56.3%) strongly agree with the statement that cybersecurity threats now 
exceed the capability of the current workforce and administration, while 35.6% agreed. 
Concerning cybersecurity threats now targeting explicit segments of a system 
framework, 48.1% agreed with this statement, while 35.6% strongly agreed. 
Concerning data security warnings not being as effective due to advanced threats 
42.5% of the respondents agreed, while 35.6% strongly agreed. Finally, 53.1% of the 
respondents strongly agreed that data security and privacy has now become 
progressively risky, while 38.1% simply agreed.  
Most respondents agreed with the statements, which is a reflection that the evolution 
of cybersecurity threats does have an impact on cybersecurity governance. Although 
some respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed on some of the items, and some 
choosing to remain neutral, in most instances, the overwhelming majority agreed. 
The means and standard deviation values for the evolution of cybersecurity threats 




Standard Deviation Values 
Evolution of Cybersecurity Threats Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Data security and privacy have now become progressively risky. 1.60 .771 
Data security warnings are not as effective due to advanced threats. 1.92 .861 
Cybersecurity threats now target explicit segments of a system 
framework. 
1.85 .803 
Cybersecurity threats now exceed the capabilities of the current security 
workforce and administration. 
1.84 1.027 
Cybersecurity administration workforce is now faced with an expanded 
number of assaults. 
1.51 .673 
Table 9: Evolution of Cybersecurity Threats Standard Deviation Values 
Table 9 above shows that the values of standard deviation are fairly high, which 
reflects that the numbers are more spread out. 
5.2.4 Evolution of Institutional Goals 
One of the key variables used in this study to examine cybersecurity governance is 
institutional goals. As this research seeks to study the relationship between 
cybersecurity governance and its various antecedents, special focus is placed on the 
role of institutional goals to ensure successful implementation of these cybersecurity 
programmes. Institutional goals are examined in the context of institutional objectives, 
cybersecurity programmes, cybersecurity procedures and administration 
programmes. The participants’ response breakdown is illustrated in Figure 22 and 




Figure 22: Evolution of Institutional Goals 
As depicted in Figure 22 and concerning the first item that relates to the fact that 
institutional objectives on cybersecurity ought to be characterised inside a high-level 
report taken care of by senior administration, 44.4% of the respondents agreed, while 
46.3% strongly agreed. Concerning the fact that institutions that have compelling 
cybersecurity programmes regularly have instruments for non-stop observing and 
audit, 41.3% agreed, while 46.3% disagreed. Furthermore, a significant 66.3% 
strongly agreed that institutions must define a reasonable cybersecurity procedure that 
outlines cybersecurity dangers, while 29.4% simply agreed. Finally, relating to setting 
up a decent cybersecurity administration programme, 35.6% of respondents agreed, 
while a majority of 62.5% strongly disagreed. 
In summary, it is noted that an overwhelming majority of respondents agree to the fact 
that institutional goals play a significant role in cybersecurity governance. Institutional 
goals that lack clarity may, as a result, negatively impact the governance of 
cybersecurity. It is also the prerogative of senior management to ensure that clear 
programme procedures and reporting mechanisms are in place to ensure successful 
cybersecurity governance. 
The means and standard deviation values for the evolution of institutional goals are 




Standard Deviation Values 
Evolution of Institutional Goals Mean Std. 
Deviation 
To set up a decent cybersecurity administration programme, 
organisations should characterise risk management as a component 
of their institutional objectives. 
1.39 .527 
Institutions must define a reasonable cybersecurity procedure that 
outlines comprehensive cybersecurity dangers related to the 
association's basic business activities. 
1.39 .615 
Institutions that have compelling cybersecurity programmes regularly 
have instruments for nonstop observing and audit. 
1.69 .777 
Institutional objectives on cybersecurity ought to be characterised 
inside a high-level report taken care of by the senior administration of 
the association. 
1.69 .832 
Table 10: Evolution of Institutional Goals Standard Deviation Values 
Table 10 above shows the high standard deviation values, which is a reflection that 
the numbers are more spread out. 
 
5.2.5 Evolution of Agency 
Evolution of agency involves the participation of humans in cybersecurity governance 
and the overall impact of their actions within the organisation. Humans are key to 
designing and implementing cybersecurity strategies and without human input, 
cybersecurity governance is non-existent. Agency examines human action, how it is 
influenced and how it affects cybersecurity governance. Three agency factors were 
used in this study to measure their impact on the cybersecurity governance, namely 
interaction, explanation and routinization. 
 
Evolution of Agency Interaction 
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The factors used to measure agency interaction in this study were staff commitment, 
innovation and collaboration. The results for agency interaction are summarised in 
Figure 23 and each bar represents a percentage value of the number of respondents. 
 
Figure 23: Evolution of Agency Interaction 
As shown in Figure 23, a significant 56.9% of the respondents strongly agreed on the 
interaction between senior officials and subordinates as a means to ensure successful 
cybersecurity administration, while 41.9% agreed. Another high number of 58.1% 
strongly agreed with the fact that preparing the workforce and utilising committed staff 
can help to authorise security strategies and improve cybersecurity administration, 
while 39.4% agreed.  
Also, 45.6% strongly agreed that a deficiency of cybersecurity personnel with sufficient 
aptitude can cause a failure to cybersecurity endeavours, while 44.4% agreed. 
Concerning the actions of humans being influenced by innovation at their disposal, 
30.0% agreed, while 57.5% strongly agreed. Finally, relating to the influence of 
urgency interaction, 46.3 agreed, while 43.7% strongly agreed.  
The means and standard deviation values for the evolution of agency interaction are 
shown in Table 11 below. 
 
Standard Deviation Values 
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Evolution of Agency Interaction Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Agency interaction influences the heading of cybersecurity programmes 
that must be bolstered by the senior authority. 
1.66 .653 
The actions of humans as agency in organisations is impacted by the 
innovation available to them. 
1.84 .678 
Deficiency of people as office workforce with sufficient cybersecurity 
aptitudes can cause the association's cybersecurity administration 
endeavours to fail. 
1.67 .724 
Preparing the workforce and utilising committed staff can help to authorise 
security strategies from inside the organisation to improve cybersecurity 
administration components. 
1.44 .547 
Interaction between the senior official and subordinates can offer 
assistance to implement existing programmes for successful cybersecurity 
administration. 
1.44 .523 
Table 11: Evolution of Agency Interaction Standard Deviation Values 
Table 11 above illustrates the values of high standard deviation values, which reflects 
the variability of the numbers. 
 
Evolution of Agency Explanation 
Agency explanation is an important factor in determining the impact of human 
behaviour in cybersecurity governance. The results for the agency explanation are 





Figure 24: Evolution of Agency Explanation 
As the data in Figure 24 shows, 54.4% strongly agreed and 42.5% only agreed to the 
statement that agency explanation must always anticipate a continued variety of 
external attacks. Concerning sharing cybersecurity data with the law enforcement 
agencies, 44.4% agreed, while 57.0% strongly agreed.  
A significant 61.3% strongly agreed to support training programmes and re-skilling of 
workers, while 35.5% also agreed. In terms of constructing relationships with 
educational institutions to communicate critical cybersecurity needs and skills gaps, 
37.5% agreed to the statement, while 54.4% strongly agreed. Concerning the 
statement that companies must establish internal retraining programmes to fill 
cybersecurity workforce deficiencies, 45.6% agreed and 50.6% strongly agreed. 
The means and standard deviation values for the evolution of agency explanation are 
shown in Table 12 below. 
Standard Deviation Values 
Evolution of Agency Explanation Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Agency explanation within companies must establish internal retraining 
programmes to fill cybersecurity workforce deficiencies. 
1.54 .592 
Organisational agency explanation must construct relationships with 1.54 .643 
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educational institutions to communicate critical cybersecurity needs and 
skills gaps. 
Policymakers including the legislature should work to support and expand 
intensive training programmes to reskill workers to improve existing 
cybersecurity administration strategies. 
1.42 .555 
Personnel in organisations ought to consider sharing cybersecurity data 
with law enforcement agencies to successfully pursue criminal and civil 
investigations against perpetrators. 
1.71 .715 
Agency explanation must always anticipate a continued variety of external 
attacks. 
1.50 .614 
Table 12: Evolution of Agency Explanation Standard Deviation Values 
Table 12 above depicts the high values for standard deviation, which reflects that the 
numbers are more spread out. 
 
Evolution of Agency Routinization 
The element of routinization as a factor of human agency is significant in this study in 
that it further clarifies how it affects the governance of cybersecurity. The results of 
agency routinization are depicted in Figure 25 below and each bar represents a 
percentage value of the number of respondents. 
 
Figure 25: Evolution of Agency Routinization 
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As illustrated in Figure 25, a majority of 55.0% agreed that agency routinization is vital 
to the execution and administration of the co-evolution forms, while 37.5% strongly 
agreed. Relating to the statement that agency routinization must have adequate 
information on components that drive the development of cybersecurity governance, 
49.4% agreed, while 44.4% disagreed. Concerning the need for routinization 
procedures to be proactive and supplement conventional techniques, 55.9% agreed 
and 35.6% strongly agreed. Concerning the statement that without normalised forms 
by agency routinization it is hard for associations to guarantee an effective 
cybersecurity programme, 52.5% agreed, while 35.6% strongly agreed. 
In summary, the majority of the respondents agreed with most of the statements that 
relate to the three factors of agency and how they directly impact on the governance 
of cybersecurity. Although some respondents disagreed or decided to be neutral, the 
numbers are negligibly low in comparison to the overwhelming number of respondents 
who agreed.  
The means and standard deviation values for the evolution of routinization are shown 
in Table 13 below. 
Standard Deviation Values 
Evolution of Routinization Mean Std. 
Deviation 
I hereby consent to my responses being used as outlined above. 1.00 .000 
Without normalised forms by agency routinization, it is hard for 
associations to guarantee an effective cybersecurity programme. 
1.79 .728 
Cybersecurity routinization procedures must concentrate on the 
incorporation of proactive ways to deal with supplement conventional 
techniques. 
1.75 .654 
Agency routinization must have adequate information on components that 
drive the development of cybersecurity governance. 
1.63 .641 
Agency routinization is vital to the execution and administration of the co-
evolution forms to effectively organise a successful cybersecurity 
administration instrument. 
1.72 .665 
Table 13: Evolution of Routinization Standard Deviation Values 
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Table 13 above shows the high standard deviation values, which reflects that the 
numbers are more spread out. 
 
5.3. Reliability Analysis 
Reliability analysis is an important aspect of this study since there are independent 
variables used. Also, since the study seeks to identify the relationship between the 
various constructs of information security and cybersecurity governance, performing a 
reliability test is important. To do this, Cronbach’s Alpha was used to measure how 
closely the relationship of the construct is as a group, that is, the internal consistency 
(Hulin et al., 2001). It is must be noted that some of the variables were excluded from 
analysis since they did not load into the component model. As a result, the number of 
items ranged from an initial total of five items per construct to two. The results of the 
reliability analysis are shown in Table 14 below. 
Factor Item Cronbach's 
Alpha 
N of Items 
 
Evolution of technology 0.748 5 
Evolution of cybersecurity threats 0.769 5 
Evolutionary cybersecurity governance 0.740 3 
Evolution of institutional goals 0.539 2 
Evolution of interaction 0.555 2 
Evolution of explanation 0.631 3 
Evolution of routinization 0.740 4 
Table 14: Reliability Analysis 
As a general rule, acceptable levels of reliability must have Cronbach’s Alpha values 
between 0.6 and 0.7, whilst a value of 0.8 or higher indicate a very good level (Hulin 
et al., 2001). Based on the results, it can be concluded that five items had an Alpha 
value greater than 0.6 and can be said to be reliable. Only two items fell just slightly 
below the 0.6 Cronbach’s value. 
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Most items were therefore found to be consistent and closely related to each other. 
Evolution of technology, the evolution of cyber-security threats, evolutionary 
cybersecurity governance, the evolution of explanation and evolution of routinization 
all showed a greater level of reliability while the evolution of institutional goals and the 
evolution of interaction showed a lower level of reliability.  
 
5.4. Factor Analysis 
Factor analysis is based on the assumption that some underlying factors, which may 
be smaller in number than the observed variables, are responsible for the covariation 
among the observed variables (Kim and Mueller, 2011). As part of data analysis, factor 
analysis was done on all the constructs from the data collected. 
 
5.4.1 KMO and Bartlett’s Test  
The KMO and Bartlett's Test is designed to calculate statistics that indicate the 
proportion of variance in variables that might be caused by certain underlying factors 
(IBM, 2020). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy indicates that a 
high value of 1.0 generally indicates that the factor analysis may be useful with the 
data, while a value less than 0.50 may indicate that the factor analysis will probably 
not be useful with your data. The Bartlett's test of sphericity performed in this study 
indicates that the variables are related and therefore unsuitable for structure detection 
(Yong and Pearce, 2013). Values reflecting a significant level of less than 0.05 indicate 
that factor analysis is useful with your data. Table 15 depicts the results from the KMO 
and Bartlett's Test of all the variables. 
 

































Olkin Measure of 
Sampling 
Adequacy 








165.285 185.142 113.575 23.154 25.254 67.312 139.104 
df 10 10 3 1 1 3 6 
Sig. .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
Table 15: KMO and Bartlett’s Test 
As the results show, this research obtained a KMO value of more than 0.5 (p>0.5) on 
all variables measured, which indicates that the factor analysis was statistically useful 
for this research. Also, Bartlett's test of sphericity is less than 0.05 (p<0.05) on all 
variables, which means that factor analysis may be useful with this data. 
 
5.4.2 Total Variance 
This is one of the most widely used methods in exploratory factor analysis that makes 
use of the eigenvalues, described as a measure of explained variance, to determine 
how many factors to retain (Yong and Pearce, 2013).  
An eigenvalue greater than 1.0 is deemed to be a common criterion for a factor to be 
useful. When the eigenvalue is less than 1.0, the information explained by the factor 
is less than what a single item would have explained. The Total Variance Explained 
table is shown in Table 16 below. 




Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
















1 4.980 20.748 20.748 4.980 20.748 20.748 2.683 11.177 11.177 
2 2.441 10.173 30.921 2.441 10.173 30.921 2.615 10.894 22.072 
3 1.937 8.070 38.991 1.937 8.070 38.991 2.364 9.849 31.921 
4 1.859 7.745 46.736 1.859 7.745 46.736 2.112 8.801 40.721 
5 1.255 5.228 51.964 1.255 5.228 51.964 1.864 7.768 48.490 
6 1.090 4.544 56.508 1.090 4.544 56.508 1.480 6.167 54.656 
7 1.017 4.236 60.744 1.017 4.236 60.744 1.461 6.087 60.744 
8 .987 4.114 64.857       
9 .854 3.557 68.414       
10 .820 3.417 71.832       
11 .763 3.180 75.012       
12 .717 2.987 77.998       
13 .663 2.763 80.762       
14 .609 2.538 83.300       
15 .553 2.305 85.605       
16 .527 2.194 87.800       
17 .496 2.066 89.865       
18 .451 1.878 91.744       
19 .413 1.720 93.464       
20 .397 1.653 95.117       
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21 .339 1.412 96.529       
22 .298 1.243 97.772       
23 .284 1.185 98.957       
24 .250 1.043 100.000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Table 16: Rotated Component Matrix 
The results in Table 16 show how the variance is divided among the 24 possible 
factors. Note that seven factors have eigenvalues greater than 1.0 and together they 
account for approximately 67.7% of the variability in the original variables. This 
suggests that seven latent influences are associated with Evolutionary Cybersecurity 
Governance, but there remains room for a lot of unexplained variation. 
 
5.4.3 Rotated Component Matrix 
While Factor Matrix shows the factor loadings before rotation, Rotated Factor Matrix, 
on the other hand, shows you the rotated factor loadings. Using rotation and 
suppressing small coefficients helps with the interpretation of the data (Yong and 
Pearce, 2013). Rotated Component Matrix was performed on the data collected in this 
study to illustrate the relationships that are somewhat unclear in the unrotated factor 
matrix and the results are illustrated in Annexure B.  
 
The principal component analysis with varimax rotation was conducted to assess how 
the variables loaded. The results in Annexure B displays the item and component 
loadings for the rotated components. Loadings with less than 0.50 were omitted to 
improve clarity. Results suggest that Evolution of Cybersecurity Threats load with 
component 1 and thus all form a coherent component. Similarly, 
Evolution_of_Technology_A1-A5 all load in component 2 and therefore are coherent; 
the same as Evolution_of_Agency_C1-C4, which loads at component 3. However, 
Evolution_of_Technology_B1-B2 fails to load at component 4, unlike 
Evolution_of_Technology_B3-B4. This suggests that these two measures are not 
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substantially related and should not be aggregated with each other. Also, unlike 
Evolution_of_Agency_B5/B4/B3, Evolution_of_Agency_B1/B4 failed to load at 
component 5. The same applied to Evolution_of_Agency_A1-A3, which loaded 
differently to Evolution_of_Agency_A4-A5, which loaded at component 6. 
Evolution_of_Institu_Goals_3 and Evolution_of_Institu_Goals_4 both loaded at 
component 7, in contrast with Evolution_of_Institu_Goals_1 and 
Evolution_of_Institu_Goals_2, which loaded differently. As stated, the measures that 
loaded differently were omitted and should not be aggregated as they are not 
substantially related.  
  
5.5. Correlation Analysis 
The section below presents a correlation analysis of the Evolution of Cybersecurity 
Governance against the various constructs stated. This is to test whether there is a 
statistically significant linear relationship among the variables and by so doing infer 
whether the association is significant in the population. The positive r value suggests 
a positive relationship between the two variables, that is, the larger X, the larger Y, 
while a negative r value indicates a negative relationship (the larger X, the larger Y). 
Also, as a rule of thumb, a correlation is statistically significant if it is “Sig. (2-tailed)” < 
0.05 (Berg, 2020). 
 
5.5.1 Correlation of Evolution of Technology 
In this study, a bivariate Pearson Correlation was used to test whether there is a 
substantially significant linear relationship between Evolutionary Cybersecurity 
Governance and the other constructs and to determine the direction and strength of 
the association. The results of the analysis are illustrated in Annexure C. 
As noted, the correlation coefficient for Evolutionary Cybersecurity Governance and 
Evolution of Technology 0.112 and p-value is 0.78. Because p must be less than 0.05, 
there is no significant relationship between evolutionary cybersecurity governance and 
the evolution of technology. The data also shows that the coefficient value between 
cybersecurity governance and evolution of cybersecurity threats is 0.200 and a p-value 
of 0.006 and thus, there is a significant relationship between the two variables. Also, 
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the data shows that there is a positive statistically significant relationship between 
evolutionary cybersecurity governance and the evolution of institutional goals 
(coefficient = 0.353 and p < 0.05). Furthermore, evolutionary cybersecurity 
governance has a significant relationship with the evolution of interaction with a 
coefficient value of 0.142 and p-value of 0.037. Another positive significant relationship 
is shown between evolutionary cybersecurity governance and the evolution of 
explanation, coefficient = 0.207, p = 0.04). Finally, the correlation coefficient between 
evolutionary cybersecurity governance and evolution of routinization is 0.188 and  
p < 0.009; therefore, one can deduce that changes in the evolution of routinization will 
cause changes in cybersecurity governance. 
 
5.6. Regression Analysis 
A variety of regression analysis techniques built on statistical concepts such as 
correlation and directionality of data, multiple regression analysis, estimating the 
model and hypothesis testing were performed in this study. This section looks at 
interpreting the various regression results which, according to Dhakal (2018), reveal 
that there is no single right way to interpret regression results. 
 
5.6.1 Multiple Regression  
Multiple regression is one of the most significant steps after correlation. It is used in 
this study to predict the value of Evolutionary Cybersecurity Governance based on the 
other predictor variables. Multiple regression may also be used to determine the 
overall fit of the model and the contribution of each of the predictors relative to the 









Table 17: Multiple Regression Model Summary 
 
As depicted in Table 17, the value of R, which denotes the correlation between 
evolutionary cybersecurity governance and the predictors, is 0.390. Since this a 
slightly low correlation, our model predicts Evolutionary Cybersecurity Governance 
rather less precisely. The data also shows that the value of “R Square” is 0.152. This, 
therefore, suggests that the model’s independent variables explain 15.2% of the 
variability of the dependent variable, Evolutionary Cybersecurity Governance and that 
84.4% of the variation is caused by factors other than the predictors included in the 
model. The value of “R Squared” is therefore low and suggests that the regression 
model poorly fits the data set. The low discrepancy between the values of R-squared 
and adjusted R Square, however, may indicate a good fit of the model. The data also 
shows a high standard error value of 0.61686, which suggests that the estimates of 
Evolutionary Cybersecurity Governance with this model will be wrong by 
approximately 0.62, which is not an ignorable amount. 
 
5.6.2 ANOVA – Statistical Significance of the Model 
The F-ratio in the ANOVA table, shown in Table 18 below, tests whether the overall 
regression model is a good fit for the data. The statistical significance of each of the 





























.152 .119 .61686 .152 4.571 6 15
3 
.000 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Evolution_of_Routinization, Evolution_of_Technology, 
Evolution_of_Institutional_Goals, Evolution_of_Interaction, Evolution_of_CyberSecurity_Threats, 
Evolution_of_Explanation 
b. Dependent Variable: Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 
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are equal to zero in the sample. Hence, if p < 0.05, the coefficients are statistically 
significantly different to zero. 
ANOVAa 





1 Regression 10.436 6 1.739 4.571 .000b 
Residual 58.220 153 .381   
Total 68.656 159    
a. Dependent Variable: Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Evolution_of_Routinization, Evolution_of_Technology, 
Evolution_of_Institutional_Goals, Evolution_of_Interaction, 
Evolution_of_CyberSecurity_Threats, Evolution_of_Explanation 
Table 18: Statistical Significance of the Model 
The results in Table 18 show that the independent variables statistically significantly 
predict the dependent variable F (6, 153) = 4.571, p (0.000) < 0.05, which suggests 
that the regression model is a good fit for the data. This suggests that changes in the 
predictor variables influence corresponding changes in cybersecurity governance. The 
results are therefore useful in that the tests of significance seek to investigate if each 
explanatory variable can be in model.  
  
5.6.3 Coefficients 
One of the important tables of regression analysis is the coefficients table. The 
coefficient values in the B column describe how many units job performance increases 
for a single predictor unit increase. On the other hand, the Beta coefficient values allow 
for the comparison of relative strengths of the predictors. Table 19 below shows the 












1 (Constant) .764 .265  2.884 .004 
Evolution_of_Technology .109 .127 .067 .860 .391 
Evolution_of_CyberSecurity_Threats .073 .091 .067 .801 .425 
Evolution_of_Institutional_Goals .297 .079 .301 3.750 .000 
Evolution_of_Interaction .034 .126 .023 .268 .789 
Evolution_of_Explanation .119 .129 .083 .921 .359 
Evolution_of_Routinisation .031 .115 .024 .268 .789 
a. Dependent Variable: Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 
Table 19: Coefficients 
Given that the t-value and corresponding p-value are in the “t” and “Sig.” columns 
respectively, the test results therefore show that only Evolution_of_Institutional_Goals, 
p (0.000) <0.05 is significant. The other predictors, Evolution_of_Technology, p 
(0.391) > 0.05, Evolution_of_CyberSecurity_Threats, p (0.425) > 0.05, 
Evolution_of_Interaction, p (0.789) >0.05, Evolution_of_Explanation, p (0.359) >0.05 
and Evolution_of_Routinisation, p (0.789) >0.05, are not significant. This means that 
these explanatory variables are not useful in the model when 
Evolution_of_Institutional_Goals is already in the model. 
5.7. Hypothesis Test Results 
Hypothesis 1  





 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Evolution_of_CyberSecurity_Threats 1.7437 .60196 160 
Evolution_of_Technology 1.40 .400 160 
Table 20: Descriptive Statistics (Evolution of Cybersecurity Threats – Evolution of 
Technology) 
Table 20 above provides the mean value, standard deviation and sample size for the 
dependent variable, evolution of cybersecurity threats and independent variable, the 
evolution of technology. 
 
Correlations 
Correlations are used to estimate the strength of a linear relationship between two 
variables. Coefficients of correlations range between -1.0 and 1.0 for perfectly 
negative and perfectly positive correlations respectively. The closer the coefficients 
get to -1.0 or 1.0, the stronger the correlations, while the closer a correlation coefficient 
gets to zero, the weaker the correlation is between the two variables. 
The correlation between the evolution of cybersecurity threats and the evolution of 










Evolution_of_CyberSecurity_Threats 1.000 .215 
Evolution_of_Technology .215 1.000 
Sig. (1-tailed) Evolution_of_CyberSecurity_Threats . .003 
Evolution_of_Technology .003 . 
N Evolution_of_CyberSecurity_Threats 160 160 
Evolution_of_Technology 160 160 
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Table 21: Correlations (Evolution of Cybersecurity Threats – Evolution of 
Technology) 
Table 21 further shows the correlation between these two variables. The table shows 
the correlation coefficient of 0.215. The number of respondents in the sample is 160.p-
value for this correlation coefficient is 0.003. Because p<0.05, it can be concluded that 
the relationship is statistically significant.  
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .215a .046 .040 .58969 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Evolution_of_Technology 
Table 22: Model Summary (Evolution of Cybersecurity Threats – Evolution of 
Technology) 
Table 22 shows the results of the model summary. In this case, the R-value is 0.215, 
which indicates that the model predicts the evolution of cybersecurity threats precisely. 
The R squared value is 0.46 whilst the adjusted R squared value is 0.040. 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2.672 1 2.672 7.684 .006b 
Residual 54.942 158 .348   
Total 57.614 159    
a. Dependent Variable: Evolution_of_CyberSecurity_Threats 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Evolution_of_Technology 




Table 23 gives the main effects of the ANOVA test to see if there is any significant 
difference that exists in the dependent variable and the independent variable. In this 








B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1.290 .170  7.579 .000 
Evolution_of_Technology .324 .117 .215 2.772 .006 
a. Dependent Variable: Evolution_of_CyberSecurity_Threats 
Table 24: Coefficients (Evolution of Cybersecurity Threats – Evolution of 
Technology) 
The coefficients table is shown in Table 24 with a positive B coefficient value of 0.324, 
Beta value of 0.215 and p-value of 0.006, which indicates the existence of a statistical 
significance. The hypothesis is accepted and it can be concluded that a change of 
technology leads to a change in the nature of cybersecurity threats. 
Hypothesis 2  
H2: A change in technology leads to a change in evolution of cybersecurity 
governance. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 1.8250 .65711 160 
Evolution_of_Technology 1.40 .400 160 




Table 25 above provides the mean value, standard deviation and sample size for the 
dependent variable, the evolution of technology and independent variable, the 
evolution of cybersecurity governance.  











Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 1.000 .112 
Evolution_of_Technology .112 1.000 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance . .078 
Evolution_of_Technology .078 . 
N Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 160 160 
Evolution_of_Technology 160 160 
Table 26: Correlations (Evolution of Technology – Evolutionary Cybersecurity 
Governance) 
Table 26 shows the correlation between these two variables. The correlation 
coefficient is 0.112, the number of respondents in the sample is 160 and the p-value 




Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .112a .013 .006 .65501 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Evolution_of_Technology 
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Table 27: Model Summary (Evolution of Technology – Evolutionary Cybersecurity 
Governance) 
Table 27 shows the results of the model summary. In this case, the R-value is 0.112, 
which indicates a low level of prediction. The R squared value of 0.013 suggests that 
the evolution of technology explains only 1.3% of the variability of the evolution of 
cybersecurity governance. The adjusted R squared value is 0.006. 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .868 1 .868 2.022 .157b 
Residual 67.788 158 .429   
Total 68.656 159    
a. Dependent Variable: Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Evolution_of_Technology 
Table 28: ANOVA (Evolution of Technology – Evolutionary Cybersecurity 
Governance) 
Table 28 provides the main effects of the ANOVA test that checks if there is any 
significant difference that exists between the evolution of cybersecurity governance 
and the evolution of technology. In this test, the table shows that F(1, 158) = 2.022, 
and p(0.157)>0.05, which suggests that the evolution of technology does not 
statistically significantly predict the evolution of cybersecurity governance and that the 








B Std. Error Beta 
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1 (Constant) 1.566 .189  8.285 .000 
Evolution_of_Technology .185 .130 .112 1.422 .157 
a. Dependent Variable: Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 
Table 29: Coefficients (Evolution of Technology – Evolutionary Cybersecurity 
Governance) 
The coefficients table in Table 29 shows a positive B coefficient value of 0.185, Beta 
value of 0.112 and p-value of 0.157, which indicates that there is no statistical 
significance. The hypothesis is therefore rejected and it can be concluded that a 
change of technology does not lead to a change in cybersecurity governance. 
 
Hypothesis 3  
H3: A change in cybersecurity threats leads to a change in evolution of cybersecurity 
governance. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 1.8250 .65711 160 
Evolution_of_CyberSecurity_Threats 1.7437 .60196 160 
Table 30: Descriptive Statistics (Evolution of Cybersecurity Threats – Evolution of 
Cybersecurity Governance) 
Table 30 above provides the mean value, standard deviation and sample size for the 
evolution of cybersecurity governance and the evolution of cybersecurity threats. 
















Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 1.000 .200 
Evolution_of_CyberSecurity_Threats .200 1.000 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance . .006 
Evolution_of_CyberSecurity_Threats .006 . 
N Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 160 160 
Evolution_of_CyberSecurity_Threats 160 160 
Table 31: Correlations (Evolution of Cybersecurity Threats – Evolution of 
Cybersecurity Governance) 
The correlation between these two variables is illustrated in Table 31. The table shows 
the correlation coefficient value of 0.200 from the sample of 160 respondents. The p-
value for this correlation coefficient is 0.006, which suggests that the relationship is 
statistically significant.  
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .200a .040 .034 .64591 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Evolution_of_CyberSecurity_Threats 
Table 32: Model Summary (Evolution of Cybersecurity Threats – Evolution of 
Cybersecurity Governance) 
Table 32 shows the results of the model summary. In this case, the R-value is 0.200, 
R squared = 0.40 whilst the adjusted R squared value is 0.034. 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2.737 1 2.737 6.561 .011b 
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Residual 65.918 158 .417   
Total 68.656 159    
a. Dependent Variable: Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Evolution_of_CyberSecurity_Threats 
Table 33: ANOVA (Evolution of Cybersecurity Threats – Evolution of Cybersecurity 
Governance) 
Table 33 provides the main effects of the ANOVA test that checks if there is any 
significant difference that exists between the evolution of cybersecurity governance 
and the evolution of technology. In this test, the table shows that F(1, 158) = 6.561, p 
(0.011) < 0.05, which indicates a statistically significant relationship between the 
evolution of technology and the evolution of cybersecurity governance and that the 










1 (Constant) 1.445 .157  9.207 .000 
Evolution_of_CyberSecurity_Threats .218 .085 .200 2.562 .011 
a. Dependent Variable: Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 
Table 34: Coefficients (Evolution of Cybersecurity Threats – Evolution of 
Cybersecurity Governance) 
The coefficients table is shown in Table 34 with a positive B coefficient value of 0.218, 
Beta value of 0.200 and p-value of 0.011, which suggests that the relationship is 
statistically significant. The hypothesis is accepted and it can be concluded that a 
change in cybersecurity threats leads to a change in cybersecurity governance. 
 
Hypothesis 4  
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H4: A change of institutional goals leads to a change in evolution of cybersecurity 
governance. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 1.8250 .65711 160 
Evolution_of_Institutional_Goals 1.6938 .66585 160 
Table 35: Descriptive Statistics (Evolution of Institutional Goals – Evolution of 
Cybersecurity Governance) 
Table 35 above provides the mean value, standard deviation and sample size for the 
evolution of cybersecurity governance and the evolution of institutional goals variables. 











Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 1.000  .353 
Evolution_of_Institutional_Goals .353 1.000 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance . .000 
Evolution_of_Institutional_Goals .000 . 
N Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 160 160 
Evolution_of_Institutional_Goals 160 160 
Table 36: Correlations (Evolution of Cybersecurity Threats – Evolution of 
Cybersecurity Governance) 
Table 36 depicts the correlation between these two variables. The table shows the 
correlation coefficient of 0.353. The number of respondents in the sample is 160, the 
p-value for this correlation coefficient is 0.000. p(0.000)<0.05, thus the relationship is 





Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .353a .125 .119 .61663 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Evolution_of_Institutional_Goals 
Table 37: Model Summary (Evolution of Cybersecurity Threats – Evolution of 
Cybersecurity Governance) 
Table 37 shows the results of the model summary. In this case, R = 0.353, R squared 




Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 8.579 1 8.579 22.562 .000b 
Residual 60.077 158 .380   
Total 68.656 159    
a. Dependent Variable: Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Evolution_of_Institutional_Goals 
Table 38: ANOVA (Evolution of Cybersecurity Threats – Evolution of Cybersecurity 
Governance) 
Table 38 provides the main effects of the ANOVA test that checks if there is any 
significant difference that exists between the evolution of cybersecurity governance 
and the evolution of technology. In this test, the table shows that F(1, 158) = 22.562, 
p (0.000) < 0.05. This result thus indicates the existence of a statistically significant 
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B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1.234 .134  9.237 .000 
Evolution_of_Institutional_Goals .349 .073 .353 4.750 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 
Table 39: Coefficients (Institutional Goals – Cybersecurity Governance) 
Table 39 shows the coefficients table with a positive B coefficient value of 0.349, Beta 
value of 0.353 and p-value of 0.000, which indicates the existence of a statistically 
significant relationship. The hypothesis is accepted and it can be concluded that a 
change of institutional goals leads to a change in cybersecurity governance. 
 
Hypothesis 5  
H5: A change of interaction of agency leads to a change in evolution of cybersecurity 
governance. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 1.8250 .65711 160 
Evolution_of_Interaction 1.4438 .44505 160 




Table 40 provides the mean value, standard deviation and sample size for the 
dependent variable, evolution of cybersecurity governance and independent variable, 
the evolution of interaction.  











Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 1.000 .142 
Evolution_of_Interaction .142 1.000 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance . .037 
Evolution_of_Interaction .037 . 
N Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 160 160 
Evolution_of_Interaction 160 160 
Table 41: Correlations (Evolution of Interaction – Evolution of Cybersecurity 
Governance) 
The correlation between these two variables is shown in Table 41 above. The table 
shows the correlation coefficient of 0.142, the number of respondents in the sample is 
160 and the p-value of 0.037. p is < 0.05, and therefore it can be concluded that the 
relationship is statistically significant.  
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .142a .020 .014 .65253 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Evolution_of_Interaction 




Table 42 shows the results of the model summary. The R-value is 0.142, the R 
squared value is 0.020 whilst the adjusted R squared value is 0.014. The value of 
0.014 therefore shows that the variable evolution of interaction explains only 1.4% of 
the variability of our dependent variable. 
 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 1.380 1 1.380 3.240 .074b 
Residual 67.276 158 .426   
Total 68.656 159    
a. Dependent Variable: Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Evolution_of_Interaction 
Table 43: ANOVA (Evolution of Interaction – Evolution of Cybersecurity 
Governance) 
Table 43 depicts the effects of the ANOVA test. The table shows that F(1, 158) = 
3.240, and p(0.074)>0.05, which suggests that evolution of interaction does not 
statistically significantly predict the evolution of cybersecurity governance and that the 







t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1.523 .176  8.671 .000 
Evolution_of_Interaction .209 .116 .142 1.800 .074 
a. Dependent Variable: Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 
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Table 44: Coefficients (Interaction – Cybersecurity Governance) 
The coefficients table in Table 44 shows a positive B coefficient value of 0.209, Beta 
value of 0.142 and p-value of 0.074, which indicates that there is no statistical 
significance since p>0.05. The hypothesis is therefore rejected and it can be 
concluded that change of interaction of agency does not lead to a change in 
cybersecurity governance. 
 
Hypothesis 6  
H6: A change of routinization of agency leads to a change in evolution of cybersecurity 
governance. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 1.8250 .65711 160 
Evolution_of_Routinisation 1.7234 .50438 160 
Table 45: Descriptive Statistics (Evolution of Routinization – Evolution of 
Cybersecurity Governance) 
Table 45 above provides the mean value, standard deviation and sample size for the 
evolution of cybersecurity governance and the independent variable, evolution of 










Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 1.000 .188 
Evolution_of_Routinisation .188 1.000 





Evolution_of_Routinisation .009 . 
N Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 160 160 
Evolution_of_Routinisation 160 160 
Table 46: Correlations (Evolution of Routinization – Evolution of Cybersecurity 
Governance) 
Table 46 further shows the correlation between these two variables with a correlation 
coefficient of 0.188, respondents sample of 160 and p-value of 0.009. p>0.005, it can 
be concluded that the relationship is not statistically significant.  
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .188a .035 .029 .64740 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Evolution_of_Routinisation 
Table 47: Model Summary (Evolution of Routinization – Evolution of Cybersecurity 
Governance) 
Table 47 shows the results of the model summary. The R-value is 0.188, the R 
squared value is 0.035 and the adjusted R squared value is 0.029, which suggests 
that the variable evolution of Routinization explains only 2.9% of the variability of the 
evolution of cybersecurity governance. 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2.434 1 2.434 5.808 .017b 
Residual 66.221 158 .419   
Total 68.656 159    
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a. Dependent Variable: Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Evolution_of_Routinisation 
Table 48: ANOVA (Evolution of Routinization – Evolution of Cybersecurity 
Governance) 
Table 48 shows the results of the ANOVA test. The table shows that F(1, 158) = 5.808 
and p(0.017)<0.05, which suggests that the evolution of routinization is statistically 
significant and predicts the evolution of cybersecurity governance and that the 








B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1.402 .183  7.673 .000 
Evolution_of_Routinisation .245 .102 .188 2.410 .017 
a. Dependent Variable: Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 
Table 49: Coefficients (Evolution of Routinization – Evolution of Cybersecurity 
Governance) 
The coefficients table in Table 49 shows a positive B coefficient value of 0.245, Beta 
value of 0.188 and p-value of 0.017, which indicates that there is statistical significance 
because p<0.05. The hypothesis is accepted and it can be concluded that a change 
of routinization of agency leads to a change in cybersecurity governance. 
 
Hypothesis 7  





 Mean Std. Deviation N 
Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 1.8250 .65711 160 
Evolution_of_Explanation 1.4854 .45916 160 
Table 50: Descriptive Statistics (Evolution of Explanation – Evolution of 
Cybersecurity Governance) 
Table 50 above provides the mean value, standard deviation and sample size for the 
evolution of cybersecurity governance and evolution of explanation. Table 51 further 











Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 1.000 .207 
Evolution_of_Explanation .207 1.000 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance . .004 
Evolution_of_Explanation .004 . 
N Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 160 160 
Evolution_of_Explanation 160 160 
Table 51: Correlations (Evolution of Explanation – Evolution of Cybersecurity 
Governance) 
The table shows a correlation coefficient of 0.207. The number of respondents in the 
sample is 160. The p-value is 0.004. p<0.005 and therefore it can be concluded that 
the relationship is statistically significant.  
Model Summary 




1 .207a .043 .037 .64493 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Evolution_of_Explanation 
Table 52: Model Summary (Evolution of Explanation – Evolution of Cybersecurity 
Governance) 
Table 52 shows the results of the model summary. In this case, the R-value is 0.207, 
which indicates that the model predicts the evolution of cybersecurity governance 
precisely. The R squared value is 0.43 and the adjusted R squared value is 0.040. 
ANOVAa 
Model Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2.939 1 2.939 7.065 .009b 
Residual 65.717 158 .416   
Total 68.656 159    
a. Dependent Variable: Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Evolution_of_Explanation 
Table 53: ANOVA (Evolution of Explanation – Evolution of Cybersecurity 
Governance) 
Table 53 illustrates the ANOVA test to confirm if there is any significant difference that 
exists between the evolution of cybersecurity governance and the evolution of 
explanation. The test shows the p-value of 0.009 and thus indicates that there is a 







B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) 1.385 .173  8.001 .000 
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Evolution_of_Explanation .296 .111 .207 2.658 .009 
a. Dependent Variable: Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance 
Table 54: Governance Coefficients (Evolution of Explanation – Evolution of 
Cybersecurity Governance) 
The coefficients table is shown in Table 54 with a positive B coefficient value of 0.296, 
Beta value of 0.111 and p-value of 0.009, which indicates the existence of a statistically 
significant relationship. The hypothesis is accepted and it can be concluded that a 
change in explanation of agency leads to a change in cybersecurity governance. 
 
5.8. Significant Test of Individual Parameters 
Further analysis was done in this study to also include Structured Equation Modelling 
(SEM) to test various equations simultaneously. Using SEM not only allows the 
researcher to test traditional models but also permits examination of more complex 
relationships and models, such as time series analysis and confirmatory factor 
analysis (Arbuckle, 2012). The researcher created a model based on theory to 
determine how to measure constructs. The results produced from SEM, which include 
overall model fit statistics and parameters, were then analysed. Table 55 below 
illustrates the output of regression weights, which displays the unstandardized and 
standardised regression coefficients and the associated test statistics. 
Structural Paths   Esti
mate 
S.E. C.R. P Label 
Evolution_of_CyberSecuri
ty_Threats 
<--- Evolution_of_Technology .324 .116 2.781 .005  
Evolution_of_Routinisatio
n 
<--- Evolution_of_Technology .102 .100 1.027 .305  
Evolution_of_Institutional
_Goals 












.349 .074 4.691 ***  
Table 55: Regression Weights 
The table shows the independent variables on the right and the depended variables 
on the left. The significant test is the value of the critical ratio (CR), which represents 
the parameter estimate divided by its standard error (Rajaram and Dhanalakshmi, 
2012). The parameter estimate is significant at p<0.05 and value of C.R is > 1.96. 
Based on the data in the table, we can deduce that there are four structural paths 
among the latent variables that are found to be significant.  
The probability of getting a critical ration as large as 2.781, 3.207, 2.644 and 4.691 in 
an absolute value is less than 0.05. In other words, the regression weight for Evolution 
of Technology, Evolution of Routinization, Evolution of Cybersecurity Threats and 
Evolution of Institutional Goals dimensions are important on Evolution of Cybersecurity 
Threats, Evolution of Institutional Goals, Evolution of Institutional Goals and 
Evolutionary Cybersecurity Governance dimensions respectively for the prediction of 
Evolutionary Cybersecurity Governance. The above variables are important factors 
that lead to a positive effect on evolutionary cybersecurity governance. The Evolution 
of Technology dimension has a low critical ratio of (1.027) on Evolution of 
Routinization, which is less than 1.96 and p (0.305) > 0.05. For that reason, this path 
is therefore eliminated. 
 
 
Structural Paths   Estimate 
Evolution_of_CyberSecurity_Threats <--- Evolution_of_Technology .215 
Evolution_of_Routinisation <--- Evolution_of_Technology .081 
Evolution_of_Institutional_Goals <--- Evolution_of_Routinisation .241 
Evolution_of_Institutional_Goals <--- Evolution_of_CyberSecurity_Threats .199 
Evolutionary_Cybersecurity_Governance <--- Evolution_of_Institutional_Goals .349 
Table 56: Standardised Regression Weights 
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Table 56 above shows the Standardised Regression Weights. Based on the results, it 
can be deduced that the estimates are not greater than 1, hence the model indicates 
a degree of less multi-co-linearity between the items supposed to be measuring 
different constructs and dimensions. 
  
5.9. Revised Theoretical Model 
After performing both the hypothesis and regression analysis tests, a new model was 
developed to illustrate the significant predictor variables of the study. The new model 
is shown in Figure 26. 
 
Figure 26: Revised Theoretical Model 
As illustrated in Figure 26, H1 shows a significant relationship between technology 
and cybersecurity threats. A technology change has a direct influence on the nature 
of cybersecurity threats (Mohurle and Patil, 2017). Similarly, a change in the type of 
threats has a direct impact on cybersecurity governance, hence the significant 
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relationship between the two in H2. A change in institutional goals shown in H4 has a 
significant relationship to the evolution of cybersecurity governance. Evolution of 
routinization and evolution of explanation in H6 and H7 respectively also show that a 
change in either of them leads to a change in the evolution of cybersecurity 
governance, as supported in previous research (Verbeek, 2010, Whittington, 2015). 
In contrast, both H2 and H6 show insignificant relationships to evolution in 
cybersecurity. Evolution in technology and the evolution of interaction do not have a 
direct influence on cybersecurity governance. This is despite the fact that technology 
originates from a functionalist and controlling way of thinking, which does not imply 
that it also allows a controlling and functional way of dealing with reality, (Verbeek, 
2010).  
The current study presents the evolutionary governance theory (EGT) framework, 
which suggests that there are models of evolutionary governance theories that would 
help with effective governance of cybersecurity in most organisations. The new model 
is important in that it presents the research findings by a clear distinction between the 
significant and insignificant relationships between the variables and evolution of 
cybersecurity governance. Evolution of technology, therefore, does not directly affect 
the evolution of cybersecurity governance. The model depicts the evolution of 
technology as having a direct effect on the evolution of threats, which then has a direct 
impact on cybersecurity governance. Technology thus has an indirect effect on 
cybersecurity governance, as described by Mohurle and Patil (2017). Organisations 
that invest in technology, therefore, are in a stronger position to implement informed 
cybersecurity governance strategies and policies. The model further illustrates that the 
evolution of agency interaction also has no direct impact on the evolution of 
cybersecurity governance. Organisations thus do not need to make big investments in 
that area if they hope to formulate strong cybersecurity governance approach 
mechanisms. 
Significantly though, the findings suggest variables such as the evolution of 
institutional goal, the evolution of threats and evolution of routinization and 
explanation, all consist of significant relationships considered as a key to the causal 
relationship. These variables, therefore, have a direct effect on the evolution of 
cybersecurity governance, as found in previous research findings (Westby, 2015). 
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Priority must be directed to these areas for organisations that seek to optimise on 
effective cybersecurity governance.  
 
5.10. Chapter 5 – Summary 
The data analysis chapter provides the interpretation of the data collected to determine 
possible findings. Descriptive statistics were first performed to give an overview of the 
respondents’ demographic information. These statistics also analysed the data to 
report the mean, median and minimum and maximum standard deviation of scores for 
each object as well as each picture. Validity and reliability were also performed to 
obtain relevant information and ensure the accuracy and consistency of the 
questionnaire and the sample. Regression analysis was performed and coefficients 
were interpreted from the output. The chapter further illustrated the model summary 
table and performed statistical significance from the ANOVA table. Also, the statistical 
significance of the independent variables from the coefficients table was explained. In 
this chapter, the regression test was used to test hypotheses, while the revised 







CHAPTER 6: Discussion and Conclusion  
This chapter discusses how EGT and ST were used in this research to describe the 
relationship between the various constructs of evolutionary cybersecurity governance. 
The chapter further describes how patterns, trends, or lack of trends are in the data 
collected including limitations encountered during the study. Importantly, the chapter 
explains how the main findings in this research can be applied to the real world, their 
importance to the cybersecurity community and how these findings impact society. 
The chapter concludes with suggestions for possible future research and 





This research was conducted to examine how governance of cybersecurity could not 
be sustained due to the evolution of various organisational aspects such as 
technology, threats to information security, human agency as well as institutional 
goals. To make cybersecurity governance more sustainable in managing and 
mitigating cybersecurity risks, the researchers conducted an extensive literature 
review to interpret and conceptualise evolutionary cybersecurity governance and the 
various factors that influence it. The study determined that the effectiveness of 
cybersecurity governance could only be attained when intervention is carried out at 
the immediate levels of institutional threat as well as agency level.  
The literature review conducted in this research was used to develop a conceptualised 
model to identify constructs that can aid in the measurement of the degree of change 
in cybersecurity governance as a result of this evolution. Information gathered from 
the literature review also assisted in developing the research hypothesis based on the 
objectives and the designed conceptual model. The research used a quantitative 
approach in the form of a survey questionnaire to collect data from a sample of 160 
participants. The data was collected using an online form, the data then converted into 
a spreadsheet and then imported into the SPSS software for analysis. 
As research in the field of cybersecurity governance is emerging, there is need for 
researchers to rely on understanding concepts and that means empirical studies 
become a requirement in understanding concepts that relate to the governance of 
cybersecurity (Kuerbis and Badiei, 2017). It is also important to understand the 
theoretical background as the research attempts to bring together the concepts of 
cybersecurity governance. This was provided through a thorough investigation of 
these concepts using the literature review.  
In the past 30 years, evolutionary research has been expanding rapidly into most 
regions, including human sciences (Carroll, 1995). Before this research, the state of 
evolutionary cybersecurity governance and the evolutionary nature of concepts that 
relate to it have been accentuating rather than improving. As such, this research 
constitutes the beginning of an intellectual revolution in the governance of 
cybersecurity. As Kshetri and Kshetri (2016) noted, the cyberspace has become less 
secure at the moment than it was 40 years ago. As such, a better understanding of 
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the state of evolutionary cybersecurity governance is needed, because, without it, any 
attempt to address cybersecurity governance would be misguided. By examining 
factors that are evolving, their impact on cybersecurity governance, directly or 
indirectly, can also be determined. 
  
6.2. Cybersecurity Governance Theory 
In seeking to answer the research question of “What are the various theories that exist 
that contribute towards effective cybersecurity governance?” this section examines 
two theories used to study factors that influence the governance of cybersecurity 
concerning post-structuralism. The findings of this research and other key insights 
derived from literature are then drawn from the analysis of these theories. Evolutionary 
governance theory and structuration theory were used in this study. Factors that were 
later identified as independent variables and tested against the dependent variable, 
the evolution of cybersecurity governance, were extracted from these theories. 
  
6.2.1 Evolutionary Governance Theory 
It was noted that technology, cybersecurity threats and institutional goals are the 
predominant factors that influence cybersecurity practices and policies and thus its 
cybersecurity governance. Based on the data from the descriptive statistics and the 
research question “To what extent does the evolution of technology affect the 
governance of cybersecurity in light of industrial post-structuralism?” it can be 
concluded that respondents deemed the evolution of technology as having a direct 
influence on the governance of cybersecurity. An organisation that uses technology 
is, therefore, seen as being in a better position to implement an effective cybersecurity 
strategy. Technology that is evolving includes but is not limited to cloud-based 
platforms, artificial intelligence, automation and the use of dashboards. Also, an 
organisation that integrates IT-based technology as part of its institutional objectives 
stands a better chance of formulating effective cybersecurity governance policies and 
practices. This is in response to the research question “How are changes in 
institutional goals responsible for formulating effective cybersecurity governance 
strategies?” Organisations are expected to develop cybersecurity strategies that 
recognise risk beyond technical IT systems to include products and services, 
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customers and also impact to third-parties such as vendors. Cybersecurity, therefore, 
demands an organisation-wide approach to protect and eventually enable the 
business. It is also essential that institutions position cybersecurity as an enabler and 
guarantor of the core business and shift the focus to competitive advantage. 
Cybersecurity threats also seem to have a direct impact on how organisations 
formulate their cybersecurity governance strategy, as deduced from the analysis of 
descriptive data. Organisations that understand the existing threat landscape are 
deemed able to deal with and effectively minimise the impact of those threats because 
they can use appropriate tools or software specific to those threats. From a personnel 
perspective, the evolution of human agency is the most dominant factor that affects 
the governance of cybersecurity. 
 
6.2.2 Structuration Theory 
As the descriptive research findings suggest, human agency and people’s practices 
have a direct impact on the evolution of cybersecurity governance and this affirms 
Giddens’s structuration theory and strategy as practice. In answer to the research 
question “What is the role of the human agency concerning the evolutionary 
governance of cybersecurity?” the structuration theory identifies three components 
that constitute an evolution of agency, namely the evolution of interaction, evolution of 
routinization and evolution of explanation. Corporate directors and officers have an 
emerging fiduciary duty of care related to information technology and that of securing 
data. The applicable standard of care also requires that directors and other c-suite 
personnel provide reasonable and appropriate physical, technical and administrative 
security measures to ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability of corporate data 
in case of a breach. As the data also shows, an understanding of potential 
cybersecurity threats is important for entry-level candidates as well and at the very 
least, also familiarity security regulations and standards. In addition to ensuring that 
organisations are adequately staffed with qualified cybersecurity personnel, 
continuous internal retraining and development of staff are also deemed essential to 
improve their ability to not only mitigate anticipated threats but also be part of the board 




6.3. Implications for Organisations 
Technologies such as big data, cloud computing, artificial intelligence and automation 
are new and unique and most often this means that organisations do not know what 
to ask to make investment decisions or what solutions they need to implement to 
defend themselves from external attacks. Organisations, therefore, remain scared to 
ask tough questions within institutional and technological contexts. As such, 
organisations are faced with a huge task of delivering effective cybersecurity 
governance strategies, further leaving them exposed to more cyber-attacks. A one-
size-fits-all may not work for organisations’ decisions to adopt an effective 
cybersecurity governance strategy. It is therefore important that organisations have a 
holistic understanding of cybersecurity governance amid the evolution, which is 
significant in leveraging evolutionary governance of cybersecurity practices and 
policies. 
Another issue of relevance and concern is the involvement of dedicated qualified and 
trained personnel within the organisation to make informed decisions and drive 
cybersecurity governance-related matters by taking them to the boardroom. This 
means organisations must re-structure and ensure cybersecurity personnel are also 
members of the board of directors. Cybersecurity staff form an important part of the 
organisation as they are responsible for reporting on current trends concerning 
cybersecurity threats, including factors that influence cybersecurity governance and 
help with justifying investment budgets in board meetings. This puts the organisation 
in a better position in terms of preparedness in the event of a data breach and also 
ensures accountability.  
 
6.4. Contributions to Knowledge 
The main reason for undertaking research is to solve a research problem or answer a 
research question. This research, however, also goes beyond that in that it also 
contributes to the existing body of knowledge in the area of evolutionary cybersecurity 
governance, specifically in the South African context. The research also serves as a 
basis for decision making and further future research. 
This research can be considered as the initial empirical study that seeks to promote 
awareness in the evolutionary nature of governance, and more specifically, 
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cybersecurity governance. This study, therefore, helps to fill the void of research in 
this area and is a significant stepping stone for future research. The results of the 
research show the extent of the influence on cybersecurity governance as a result of 
various factors that continue to evolve. While the research reveals the factors that 
influence cybersecurity governance in South Africa, it is hoped that the research will 
also be conducted on the various phenomena that underlie the actions and 
relationships of the antecedents across the world. This is so that a global view of 
evolutionary cybersecurity governance may be acquired. 
The research shows that the EGT and the structuration theory were used as a basis 
for evolutionary cybersecurity governance. The model was created and combined the 
effects of the two theories concerning post-structuralism. The model was then 
assessed using statistical techniques such as variances, correlations and averages, 
which were applied to gain insight into the population. The model is also used to 
provide an actionable basis from which aspects of evolutionary cybersecurity 
governance may be addressed and as a result, also to identify areas of performance 
weaknesses concerning post-structuralism. 
Finally, the results in this study further serve as a benchmark against which other 
evolutionary cybersecurity governance researches can be compared. This benchmark 
creates a possibility for comparing various antecedents of evolutionary cybersecurity 
governance in other geographical regions and also across the world and how it affects 
the extent of change in cybersecurity governance. 
  
6.5. Limitations 
Although effort and time go into the planning and research, unknown limitations are 
either revealed at the start of the research or while the research is being conducted. 
The first limitation of this research is that the sample used was within South Africa. 
Although cybersecurity governance is not limited to a single country, the perspective 
is that of cybersecurity governance in the South African context. There is therefore a 
possibility that respondents from other countries may give a different perspective. 
The second limitation is that the research does not specify the industry of the 
respondents. It assumes the respondents are from the private sector, so responses 
from the government sector may yield different results.  
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The third limitation is that of the size of the sample, which is 160. Given the nature of 
the study, a much bigger sample size of 300 would have been ideal to allow for 
diversity and better statistical analysis.  
The fourth limitation relates to the initial questions that were asked during the pilot 
study. The researcher had to reconsider how some of the questions were asked. For 
example, during factor analysis, some of the questions could not load properly 
because of how they were structured. 
 
6.6. Recommendations for Future Research 
The complexity of post-structural evolutionary cybersecurity governance requires a 
careful definition of evolutionary governance as a research objective and a close look 
at the research findings to figure out which aspect of evolutionary cybersecurity 
governance has been addressed in the literature or will be addressed. In particular, 
the researcher needs to understand procedures that influence others’ actions and 
whether these actions do or do not occur. Relationships that exist between the actions 
of various sorts and particular antecedent conditions need to be taken into 
consideration. Furthermore, there is a need to address evolutionary governance 
interrelations across levels of abstraction that fuse a process-like and structure-like 
perspective. For example, from a structure-like perspective, factors that influence 
cybersecurity governance may arise when goals are set that do not consider current 
trends in technology and a skilled workforce.  
There are also expectations of a complex interplay between factors involved in 
evolutionary cybersecurity governance and personal and situational characteristics 
that determine how organisations across the globe experience and react to 
evolutionary cybersecurity governance factors. There is, therefore, a need to 
conceptualise and measure evolutionary cybersecurity governance factors 
independent of their immediate consequences on organisational experiences and 
presents policies.  
Conceptualising evolutionary cybersecurity governance and the factors responsible 
for influencing it as a set within multiple evolutionary governance systems, of which 
every evolutionary system encompasses multiple levels, leads to three immediate 




1. Future research should consider that many smaller and poorer companies 
currently lack cybersecurity governance-related regulatory frameworks and 
strategies.  
2. Future research should consider examining the likely factors that influence 
cybersecurity governance by considering a global survey and how countries 
with different historical, cultural and political contexts formulate their 
cybersecurity frameworks and strategies. This study only focused on one 
nation’s view, South Africa, in this case. 
3. Future research should consider the actions of various actors and interest 
groups that lead to evolutionary cybersecurity governance-related barriers 
concerning organisational processes and mechanisms associated with actions 
of these actors that, in turn, lead to the organisations’ governance strategies 
and policy developments.  
 
6.7. Chapter 6 – Summary and Conclusion  
Research involves telling a story where knowledge can be created and shared. As 
such, the story has a beginning (the research problem, background and literature 
review), followed by how the research will take place, how data will be gathered and 
analysed (methodology), and finally, how the data results will be interpreted and a 
determination of whether the research problem was solved. The research must 
therefore be done vigorously in order not to compromise its legitimacy. Adequate time 
and resources must also be allocated and managed sufficiently throughout the 
research process. During the research process, the researcher may encounter 
limitations, which does not necessarily signify a lack of research but a form of 
consideration for future research. 
The focus of the study was to test if a relationship exists between various factors that 
were identified and cybersecurity governance. The study also examined the extent of 
influence of these factors on organisations as they seek to formulate effective 
cybersecurity strategies and policy frameworks. The factors used were extracted from 
the evolutionary governance theories obtained during the literature review process and 
their effect on evolutionary cybersecurity governance was tested individually. 
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The findings of this research reveal that factors such as the evolution of cybersecurity 
threats, the evolution of institutional goals, the evolution of routinization and the 
evolution of explanation have a direct influence on the evolution of cybersecurity 
governance. This means that these factors are central aspects for organisations that 
seek to formulate strong cybersecurity governance strategies and they, therefore, 
need to invest more in those technologies. It is not possible to completely avoid cyber-
attacks facing an organisation but they can be reduced and the associated adverse 
effects minimised by taking proactive actions by revisiting and updating key 
organisational objectives that may be associated with the above factors. On the other 
hand, as the findings of the research also show, the evolution of interaction and 
technology have no direct impact on the evolution of cybersecurity governance. 
Although there may be other forces associated with these factors that may have an 
indirect impact, organisations need not focus on the evolution of technology and 
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ANNEXURE A: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
LETTER OF CONSENT: FOR PARTICIPANTS PARTICIPATING IN THE STUDY 
 
Dear participant,  
My name is Cosmas Ngwenya, a Master’s student at the University of Johannesburg. 
You have been invited to participate in this research study that I am currently 
undertaking as you may have knowledge of cybersecurity governance as a team 
member or otherwise having been involved in cybersecurity related aspects of your 
organisation. 
Should you choose to participate, you will be requested to provide your insights on a 
number aspects relating to cybersecurity governance. This questionnaire should not 
take up more than fifteen minutes of your time. 
Participation is completely voluntary and there is no personal obligation on yourself to 
complete the questionnaire. You may also choose to withdraw at any time should you 
feel uncomfortable in answering any of the questions.  
Please note that your participation may benefit the discipline of cybersecurity 
governance by providing insights into current policies and practices and how they can 
be improved in light of the evolutionary nature of various elements that affect it. 
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This questionnaire does not solicit for information that can be used to identify a 
particular individual and measures will be taken to keep the information securely and 
encrypted. The information will ONLY be used in completing this dissertation and any 
academic work such as journals, books, chapters or conference proceedings.  
If you have any concerns or questions related to the study in general, or the items in 
the questionnaire, please contact the project leader, Cosmas Ngwenya on +27 71 040 
4452, or email cosmo4ng@gmail.com.  
Thank you for taking time to participate in this study. We are working on a project about 
Evolutionary Cyber-Security Governance. If you are older than 18 and below 65 and 
fluent in English, you are invited to participate in this study. 
 
I hereby consent to my responses being used as outlined above. 






Are you over 18 and under 65 years of age? * 





SECTION A: PARTICIPANT’S DEMOGRAPHICS 
































A4. What is the number of employees in your organisation? 
Male  
Female  
I’d prefer not to say  
18-24 years  
25-34 years  
35-44 years  
45-54ears  







































1000 or more  
Security Analyst  
Cybersecurity Engineer  
IT Director  
IT Manager  
CISO/CSO  
Systems Administrator  
Network Engineer  
Forensics Investigator  
IT Auditor  
Systems Engineer  
IT Specialist  
IT Analyst  
Support Technician  
























SECTION B: EVOLUTION OF TECHNOLOGY 
This section is aimed at understanding how technology is evolving and how it affects 
cyber-security governance in your organisation. 
0-5 Years  
6-10 Years  
11-15 Years  
16-20 Years  
21 Years and Above  
0-3 Years  
4-7 Years  
8-11 Years  
12-15 Years  
16-19 Years   
20 Years and Above  
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B1. Using the following scale, please indicate your level of agreement in relation to 




















1.  IT-based technology 
has evolved over the 
years. 
     
2.  Ideas and lessons to 
integrate IT-based 
technology has 
evolved over the 
years. 
     
3.  IT-based security 
solutions have 
evolved over the 
years. 
     
 
 
4.  Cybersecurity tools 
and technologies 
have evolved over 
the years. 
     
5.  Cloud computing and 
Internet of things has 
evolved over the 
years. 
     
 
B2. Using the following scale, please indicate your level of agreement in relation to 




























   
2.  Artificial intelligent 
growth has provided 
cybersecurity 
governance. 
     
3.  Growth in scalable 
security dashboards 
has enhanced the 




    
4.  Growth in Cloud-
based solutions has 
made cybersecurity 
governance effective. 
     











SECTION C: EVOLUTION OF CYBERSECURITY 
THREATS 
This section is aimed at understanding evolution of cybersecurity threats and how they 
affect cybersecurity governance in your organisation. 
C1. Using the following scale, please indicate your level of agreement in relation to 




















1.  Data security and 
privacy has now 
become progressively 
risky. 
     
2.  Data security warnings 
are not as effective 
due to advanced 
threats. 
     
3.  Cybersecurity threats 
now target explicit 
segments of a system 
framework. 
     
4.  Cybersecurity threats 
now exceed the 
capabilities of current 
security work force 
and administration. 
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5.  Cybersecurity 
administration work 
force is now faced with 
an expanded number 
of assaults. 
     
 
SECTION D: EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONAL GOALS 
This section is aimed at understanding potential challenges and success factors 
associated with evolution of institutional goals and how it affects cybersecurity 
governance in your organisation.  
 
D1. Using the following scale, please indicate your level of agreement in relation to 



























management as a 
component of their 
institutional objectives. 
     









related with the 
association's basic 
business activities. 




have instruments for 
nonstop observing and 
audit. 
     
4.  Institutional objectives 
on cybersecurity ought 
to be characterized 
inside a high-level report 
taken care of by senior 
administration of the 
association. 
     
 
SECTION E: EVOLUTION OF AGENCY 
This section is aimed at understanding evolution of agency and how it affects 
cybersecurity governance in your organisation.  
E1. Using the following scale, please indicate your level of agreement in relation to 





















1.  Agency interaction 
influences the heading 
of cybersecurity 
programmes that must 
bolstered by the senior 
authority. 
     
2.  The actions of humans 
as agency in 
organisations is 
impacted by the 
innovation available to 
them. 
     
3.  Deficiency of people 
as office work force 
with sufficient 
cybersecurity 




endeavours to fail. 
     
4.  Preparing of work 
force and utilizing 
committed staff can 
help authorize security 
strategies from inside 




     
5.  Interaction between 
the senior official and 
subordinates can offer 










E2. Using the following scale, please indicate your level of agreement in relation to 




















1.  Agency explanation 
within companies must 
establish internal re-
training programmes to 
fill cybersecurity 
workforce deficiencies. 
     







and skills gap. 
     
3.  Policymakers including 
the legislature should 
work to support and 




training programmes to 





4.  Personnel in 
organisations ought to 
consider sharing 
cybersecurity data with 
the law enforcement 
agencies to 
successfully pursue 
criminal and civil 
investigations against 
perpetrators. 
     
 
5.  Agency explanation 
must always anticipate 
a continued variety of 
external attacks. 
     
 
E3. Using the following scale, please indicate your level of agreement in relation to 



















1.  Without normalized 
forms by agency 
Routinization, it is hard 
for associations to 
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guarantee an effective 
cybersecurity 
programme. 




the incorporation of 




     
3.  Agency Routinization 
must have adequate 
information on 
components that drive 
the development of 
cybersecurity 
governance. 
     
4.  Agency Routinization 
is vital to the execution 
and administration of 
the co-evolution forms 














ANNEXURE B: RESIDUAL RESULTS  
 
Rotated Component Matrix 
Rotated Component Matrixa 
 Component 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Evolution_of_Threats_4 0.788             
Evolution_of_Threats_2 0.706             
Evolution_of_Threats_1 0.681             
Evolution_of_Threats_3 0.672             
Evolution_of_Threats_5 0.619             
Evolution_of_Technology_A3   0.783           
Evolution_of_Technology_A1   0.705           
Evolution_of_Technology_A2   0.699           
Evolution_of_Technology_A4   0.689           
Evolution_of_Technology_A5   0.562           
Evolution_of_Agency_C4     0.791         
Evolution_of_Agency_C2     0.758         
Evolution_of_Agency_C3     0.721         
Evolution_of_Agency_C1     0.511         
Evolution_of_Technology_B5       0.817       
Evolution_of_Technology_B4       0.764       
Evolution_of_Technology_B3       0.746       
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Evolution_of_Agency_B3         0.772     
Evolution_of_Agency_B2         0.693     
Evolution_of_Agency_B5         0.557     
Evolution_of_Agency_A5           0.740   
Evolution_of_Agency_A4           0.694   
Evolution_of_Institu_Goals_4             0.772 
Evolution_of_Institu_Goals_3             0.634 
Extraction Method: Principal 
Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with 
Kaiser Normalization. 
       
a. Rotation converged in 6 
iterations.  
b. Note. Loadings < .50 
are omitted. 













































1.000       
Evolution_of_Techn
ology 
.112 1.000      
Evolution_of_Cyber
Security_Threats 





.353 .039 .278 1.000    
Evolution_of_Intera
ction 
.142 .187 .235 .154 1.000   
Evolution_of_Expla
nation 
.207 .163 .259 .249 .447 1.000  
Evolution_of_Routin
isation 






.       
Evolution_of_Techn
ology 
.078 .      
Evolution_of_Cyber
Security_Threats 
.006 .003 .     
Evolution_of_Institut
ional_Goals 
.000 .311 .000 .    
Evolution_of_Intera
ction 
.037 .009 .001 .026 .   
Evolution_of_Expla
nation 
.004 .020 .000 .001 .000 .  
Evolution_of_Routin
isation 
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